IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/spmain/hal-03935865.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Structural Estimation of Matching Markets with Transferable Utility

Author

Listed:
  • Alfred Galichon

    (NYU - New York University [New York] - NYU - NYU System, ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Bernard Salanié

    (Columbia University [New York])

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Alfred Galichon & Bernard Salanié, 2023. "Structural Estimation of Matching Markets with Transferable Utility," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03935865, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-03935865
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03935865
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03935865/document
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jeremy T. Fox & Chenyu Yang & David H. Hsu, 2018. "Unobserved Heterogeneity in Matching Games," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(4), pages 1339-1373.
    2. Dagsvik, John K, 2000. "Aggregation in Matching Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(1), pages 27-57, February.
    3. Arnaud Dupuy & Alfred Galichon, 2014. "Personality Traits and the Marriage Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 122(6), pages 1271-1319.
    4. Arnaud Dupuy & Alfred Galichon, 2014. "Personality traits and the marriage market," SciencePo Working papers hal-03470458, HAL.
    5. Alfred Galichon, 2016. "Optimal transport methods in economics," Post-Print hal-03256830, HAL.
    6. Jeremy T. Fox, 2018. "Estimating matching games with transfers," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), pages 1-38, March.
    7. Pierre-André Chiappori & Bernard Salanié & Yoram Weiss, 2017. "Partner Choice, Investment in Children, and the Marital College Premium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(8), pages 2109-2167, August.
    8. Alfred Galichon, 2016. "Optimal transport methods in economics," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03256830, HAL.
    9. Arnaud Dupuy & Alfred Galichon, 2014. "Personality traits and the marriage market," Post-Print hal-03470458, HAL.
    10. Alfred Galichon, 2016. "Optimal Transport Methods in Economics," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 10870.
    11. Jeremy T. Fox & Patrick Bajari, 2013. "Measuring the Efficiency of an FCC Spectrum Auction," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 100-146, February.
    12. Alfred Galichon, 2016. "Optimal transport methods in economics," SciencePo Working papers hal-03256830, HAL.
    13. Becker, Gary S, 1974. "A Theory of Marriage: Part II," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(2), pages 11-26, Part II, .
    14. Jeremy T. Fox, 2010. "Identification in matching games," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(2), pages 203-254, November.
    15. Arnaud Dupuy & Alfred Galichon, 2014. "Personality traits and the marriage market," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03470458, HAL.
    16. Manski, Charles F., 1975. "Maximum score estimation of the stochastic utility model of choice," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 205-228, August.
    17. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/361levbcs399s9oa154em6h9jl is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Alfred Galichon & Bernard Salani'e, 2021. "Structural Estimation of Matching Markets with Transferable Utility," Papers 2109.07932, arXiv.org.
    2. Alfred Galichon & Bernard Salani'e, 2021. "Cupid's Invisible Hand: Social Surplus and Identification in Matching Models," Papers 2106.02371, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2023.
    3. Cristina Gualdani & Shruti Sinha, 2019. "Partial Identification in Matching Models for the Marriage Market," Papers 1902.05610, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2022.
    4. Tamás Fleiner & Ravi Jagadeesan & Zsuzsanna Jankó & Alexander Teytelboym, 2019. "Trading Networks With Frictions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(5), pages 1633-1661, September.
    5. Liang Chen & Eugene Choo & Alfred Galichon & Simon Weber, 2023. "Existence of a Competitive Equilibrium with Substitutes, with Applications to Matching and Discrete Choice Models," Papers 2309.11416, arXiv.org.
    6. Salanié, Bernard & Chiappori, Pierre-André, 2021. "Mating Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 16041, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
      • Pierre-André Chiappori & Bernard Salanié, 2021. "Mating Markets," Working Papers 2021-016, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
    7. Sinha, Shruti, 2018. "Identification in One-to-One Matching Models with Nonparametric Unobservables," TSE Working Papers 18-897, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    8. Dan Anderberg & Jesper Bagger & V. Bhaskar & Tanya Wilson, 2019. "Marriage market equilibrium, qualifications, and ability," CESifo Working Paper Series 7570, CESifo.
    9. Anna NAZSZODI & Francisco MENDONCA, 2023. "A new method for identifying the role of marital preferences at shaping marriage patterns," JODE - Journal of Demographic Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(1), pages 1-27, March.
    10. Jeremy T. Fox, 2018. "Estimating matching games with transfers," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), pages 1-38, March.
    11. Roger Koenker, 2017. "Quantile regression 40 years on," CeMMAP working papers 36/17, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    12. Kuan‐Ming Chen & Yu‐Wei Hsieh & Ming‐Jen Lin, 2023. "Reducing Recommendation Inequality Via Two‐Sided Matching: A Field Experiment Of Online Dating," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 64(3), pages 1201-1221, August.
    13. Dupuy, Arnaud & Galichon, Alfred & Sun, Yifei, 2016. "Estimating Matching Affinity Matrix under Low-Rank Constraints," IZA Discussion Papers 10449, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    14. Dupuy, Arnaud & Kennes, John & Lyng, Ran Sun, 2021. "The Market for CEOs: Building Legacy and Feeling Empowered Matter," IZA Discussion Papers 14803, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    15. Alfred Galichon & Simon Weber, 2024. "Matching under Imperfectly Transferable Utility," Papers 2403.05222, arXiv.org.
    16. Baiyu Dong & Yu-Wei Hsieh & Xing Zhang, 2022. "Implementing Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Empirical Matching Models," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 59(1), pages 1-32, January.
    17. Anton A. Cheremukhin & Paulina Restrepo-Echavarria & Antonella Tutino, 2023. "Marriage Market Sorting in the U.S," Working Papers 2023-023, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    18. Bryan S. Graham & Guido Imbens & Geert Ridder, 2016. "Identification and efficiency bounds for the average match function under conditionally exogenous matching," CeMMAP working papers 10/16, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    19. Pierre-André Chiappori & Bernard Salanié, 2016. "The Econometrics of Matching Models," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(3), pages 832-861, September.
    20. Carlier, Guillaume & Dupuy, Arnaud & Galichon, Alfred & Sun, Yifei, 2021. "SISTA: Learning Optimal Transport Costs under Sparsity Constraints," IZA Discussion Papers 14397, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-03935865. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Contact - Sciences Po Departement of Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.