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Structural Estimation of Expert Strategic Bias: The Case of Movie Reviewers

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  • Camara, Fanny
  • Dupuis, Nicolas

Abstract

We develop the first structural estimation of reputational cheap-talk games using data on movie reviews released in the US between 2004 and 2013. We identify and estimate movies' priors, as well as movie reviewers' abilities and strategic biases. We find that reviewers adopt reporting strategies that are consistent with the predictions of the literature on reputational cheap-talk. The average conservatism bias for low prior movies lies between 8 and 11%, depending on the specifications of the model. The average conservatism bias for high prior movies ranges from 13 to 15%. More- over, we find a significant, albeit small, effect of the reputation of the reviewers on their strategies, indicating that incentives to manipulate demand in order to prevent reputation updating are present in this industry. Our estimation takes into account and quantifies potential con icts of interest that might arise when the movie reviewer belongs to the same media outlet as the film under review. Out-of-sample predictions confirm that movie reviewers do have reputational concerns.

Suggested Citation

  • Camara, Fanny & Dupuis, Nicolas, 2014. "Structural Estimation of Expert Strategic Bias: The Case of Movie Reviewers," TSE Working Papers 14-534, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    • Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:28663
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dobrescu, Loretti I. & Luca, Michael & Motta, Alberto, 2013. "What makes a critic tick? Connected authors and the determinants of book reviews," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 85-103.
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    6. Matias Iaryczower & Matthew Shum, 2012. "The Value of Information in the Court: Get It Right, Keep It Tight," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(1), pages 202-237, February.
    7. Peter Boatwright & Suman Basuroy & Wagner Kamakura, 2007. "Reviewing the reviewers: The impact of individual film critics on box office performance," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 401-425, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Melissa Newham & Rune Midjord, 2019. "Do Expert Panelists Herd? Evidence from FDA Committees," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1825, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    2. Tom Hamami, 2019. "Network Effects, Bargaining Power, and Product Review Bias: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(2), pages 372-407, June.
    3. Tom Hamami & James Bailey, 2021. "Expert product reviews and conflict of interest," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(1), pages 170-176, January.
    4. Vivek Bhattacharya & Gastón Illanes & Manisha Padi, 2019. "Fiduciary Duty and the Market for Financial Advice," NBER Working Papers 25861, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Melissa Newham & Rune Midjord, 2018. "Herd Behavior in FDA Committees: A Structural Approach," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1744, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    6. Stefano Dellavigna & Johannes Hermle, 2017. "Does Conflict of Interest Lead to Biased Coverage? Evidence from Movie Reviews," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(4), pages 1510-1550.
    7. Camara, Fanny, 2019. "Avoiding Judgement by Recommending Inaction: Beliefs Manipulation and Reputational Concerns," CEPR Discussion Papers 14149, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Peeters, Thomas, 2018. "Testing the Wisdom of Crowds in the field: Transfermarkt valuations and international soccer results," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 17-29.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Structural estimation; Reputational cheap-talk game; Delegated expertise; Film Industry;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C21 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
    • L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media
    • Z11 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economics of the Arts and Literature

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