The Extent of the Market and the Optimal Degree of Specialization
AbstractIn this paper I examine the socially optimal allocation in a random matching economy. The optimal allocation is supported by punishment to defections, using the public record of agents transaction. However, public record-keeping is imperfect, as an agent s transaction is updated into the public record with probability r
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Toronto, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number shouyong-02-02.
Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 11 Jul 2002
Date of revision:
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Record-keeping; specialization; incentive constraints.;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-DGE-2002-09-21 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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