In this paper we compare production inefficiencies in bilateral meetings generated by two types of trading frictions: double-coincidence frictions and information frictions. For both types of frictions, money enlarges the sets of incentive-feasible allocations relative to barter. In environments with double-coincidence frictions, the first-best allocation is incentive-feasible if the real stock of money is sufficiently high. In contrast, in environements with information frictions, the first-best allocation is never incentivefeasible regardless of the real stock of money. These results highlight a fundamental difference between these two types of frictions. While money can eliminate the production inefficiencies that arise in bilateral meetings with a double-coincidence problem, it can only ameliorate but not eliminate the inefficiencies that are due to private information.
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Volume (Year): 138 (2002) Issue (Month): IV (December) Pages: 489-506 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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Find related papers by JEL classification: E00 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - General D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
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Aleksander Berentsen & Guillaume Rocheteau, .
"Money and Information,"
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iewwp099, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW.
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