Search, Bargaining, Money, and Prices under Private Information
AbstractThis paper presents a model of money and search where bargaining determines prices and the quality of goods is private information. It studies how a lemons problem affects the purchasing power of money. There are multiple, Pareto-ranked equilibria. The superior equilibrium, where no lemons are produced, exists even if information about quality is relatively scarce. In other equilibria, there is price dispersion, and uninformed buyers pay higher prices than informed buyers for all goods. Taxing money balances (a proxy for inflation) makes buyers less selective, thus reducing the average quality of supply and the premium paid for known quality. Copyright 1999 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 40 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
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- Manolis Galenianos & Rosalie Liccardo Pacula & Nicola Persico, 2012.
"A Search-Theoretic Model of the Retail Market for Illicit Drugs,"
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- Aleksander Berentsen & Michael McBride & Guillaume Rocheteau, 2013. "Limelight on dark markets: an experimental study of liquidity and information," ECON - Working Papers 126, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
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- Rocheteau, Guillaume, 2011. "Payments and liquidity under adverse selection," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 191-205.
- Jun Zhang & Haibin Wu, 2004. "Money, Technology Choice and Pattern of Exchange in Search Equilibrium," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 212, Econometric Society.
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