Economics without Free-disposal: Quota-induced Discarding in Heterogenous Fisheries
AbstractIndividual quota (IQ) programs are a promising and increasingly common means of regulating fisheries. This paper examines how profit maximizing fishers respond to different types of IQ programs in fisheries where many types of fish are harvested simultaneously. This analysis shows that the most common types of individual quota programs can induce discarding, and that individual quota programs that regulate the value of harvest never induce discarding. Since discarded fish have a high mortality rate, "value-based" individual quota programs are superior to their more conventional counterparts in that they waste fewer fish. The disadvantages of value-based quotas are also examined. Results are driven by the fact that the harvest technology examined here does not satisfy a "free-disposal" assumption. Since this free-disposal assumption is ubiquitous in production theory, and not obviously true, the framework developed herein may be useful for analysing a broad class of problems involving joint production.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Toronto, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number mturner-95-02.
Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 05 Dec 1995
Date of revision:
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
- K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
- D24 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2000-05-30 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2000-05-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-EFF-2000-05-30 (Efficiency & Productivity)
- NEP-ENV-2000-05-30 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2000-05-30 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2000-05-30 (Public Finance)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- William J. Furlong, 1991. "The Deterrent Effect of Regulatory Enforcement in the Fishery," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 67(1), pages 116-129.
- Diewert, W. E., 1973. "Functional forms for profit and transformation functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 284-316, June.
- Matthew A. Turner, 1995.
mturner-95-03, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Anderson, Lee G., 1994. "Thalassorama: A Note on the Economics of Discards," Marine Resource Economics, Marine Resources Foundation, vol. 9(2).
- Anderson, Lee G., 1994. "An Economic Analysis of Highgrading in ITQ Fisheries Regulation Programs," Marine Resource Economics, Marine Resources Foundation, vol. 9(3).
- Arnason, Ragnar, 1994. "On Catch Discarding in Fisheries," Marine Resource Economics, Marine Resources Foundation, vol. 9(3).
- Sakai, Yasuhiro, 1974. "Substitution and expansion effects in production theory: The case of joint production," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 255-274, November.
- Turner, Matthew A., 1996.
Marine Resource Economics,
Marine Resources Foundation, vol. 11(2).
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