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The Sorry Clause (revision of CentER DP 2016-008)

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  • Srivastava, Vatsalya

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

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  • Srivastava, Vatsalya, 2017. "The Sorry Clause (revision of CentER DP 2016-008)," Other publications TiSEM 252e9410-4c9f-4a40-9ab7-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:252e9410-4c9f-4a40-9ab7-a8a501788803
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem In Repeated Games With Discounting Or With Incomplete Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 11, pages 209-230, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    4. Joel Sobel, 2006. "For Better or Forever: Formal versus Informal Enforcement," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(2), pages 271-298, April.
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    6. Attila Ambrus & Ben Greiner, 2012. "Imperfect Public Monitoring with Costly Punishment: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(7), pages 3317-3332, December.
    7. Mungan, Murat C., 2012. "Don’t Say You’re Sorry Unless You Mean It: Pricing apologies to achieve credibility," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 178-187.
    8. Avinash Dixit, 2009. "Governance Institutions and Economic Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(1), pages 5-24, March.
    9. Joseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, 1996. "Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 103-118, Summer.
    10. Drew Fudenberg & David G. Rand & Anna Dreber, 2012. "Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(2), pages 720-749, April.
    11. Rasmusen, Eric, 1996. "Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(2), pages 519-543, October.
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    13. Clive Bull, 1987. "The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(1), pages 147-159.
    14. Benjamin Ho, 2012. "Apologies as Signals: With Evidence from a Trust Game," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 58(1), pages 141-158, January.
    15. Greif,Avner, 2006. "Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521671347.
    16. Guido Tabellini, 2008. "The Scope of Cooperation: Values and Incentives," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 123(3), pages 905-950.
    17. Posner, Richard A, 1997. "Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 365-369, May.
    18. Abeler, Johannes & Calaki, Juljana & Andree, Kai & Basek, Christoph, 2010. "The power of apology," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 233-235, May.
      • Johannes Abeler & Juljana Calaki & Kai Andree & Christoph Basek, 2009. "The Power of Apology," Discussion Papers 2009-12, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    19. Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-396, March.
    20. Scott E. Masten & Jens Prüfer, 2014. "On the Evolution of Collective Enforcement Institutions: Communities and Courts," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(2), pages 359-400.
    21. Ostrom, Elinor & Walker, James & Gardner, Roy, 1992. "Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 86(2), pages 404-417, June.
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