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Game Theory of Green and Non-green Oriented Productions: Dried Longan Enterprises

Author

Listed:
  • CHANITA PANMANEE

    (Faculty of Economics, Maejo University)

  • ROENGCHAI TANSUCHAT

    (Faculty of Economics, Chiangmai University)

  • AREE CHEAMUANGPHAN

    (Faculty of Economics, Maejo University)

  • KASEM KUNASRI

    (Faculty of Management Sciences, Chiangmai Rajabhat University)

  • NISACHON LEERATTANAKORN

    (Faculty of Economics, Maejo University)

Abstract

Dried longan is one of economic product in the northern of Thailand. It does not only solve the excess supply problem of fresh longan, but increase employment opportunities. Currently, the environmental responsibility is the important issue in which both producers and consumers are interested. Dried longan production system, thus, changes from traditional system using extravagant energy to environmentally friendly system using green technology. However, the green products are accepted in some consumer groups. Consequently, this paper explores the best decision making on green or non-green oriented productions of the dried longan enterprises by applying the game theory. The selected samples are two dried longan enterprise clusters in Chiang Mai and Lamphun provinces for playing in this game. The results represent that the green production system is the best choice of producers. It brings about the high economic payoffs but low physical resource usage. However, the information is necessary for the consumers to perceive value of green consumption and increase demand of green products. This findings are obviously useful for the dried longan enterprises in Thailand to make a decision for changing their production from traditional to green orientation.

Suggested Citation

  • Chanita Panmanee & Roengchai Tansuchat & Aree Cheamuangphan & Kasem Kunasri & Nisachon Leerattanakorn, 2015. "Game Theory of Green and Non-green Oriented Productions: Dried Longan Enterprises," Proceedings of International Academic Conferences 2704735, International Institute of Social and Economic Sciences.
    • Handle: RePEc:sek:iacpro:2704735
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dried longan enterprise clusters; Green production; Non-green production; Game theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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