Radical Moderation: Recapturing Power in Two-party Parliamentary Systems
AbstractWe estimate the parameters of a reputational game of political competition using data from five two-party parliamentary systems. We find that latent party preferences (and party reputations) persist with high probability across election periods, with one exception: parties with extreme preferences who find themselves out of power switch to moderation with higher probability than the equivalent estimated likelihood for parties in government (extreme or moderate) or for moderate parties in opposition. We find evidence for the presence of significant country-specific differences. Notably, we estimate that in the long-term, Australia is less than half as likely to experience extreme policies and Australian governments enjoy significantly longer spells in office as compared to their counterparts in Greece, Malta, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. The model outperforms alternative naive models on a battery of goodness-of-fit tests.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy in its series Wallis Working Papers with number WP61.
Length: 43 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2009
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: University of Rochester, Wallis Institute, Harkness 109B Rochester, New York 14627 U.S.A.
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Tasos Kalandrakis, 2008.
"A Reputational Theory of Two Party Competition,"
Wallis Working Papers
WP57, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
- Kalandrakis, Tasos, 2009. "A Reputational Theory of Two-Party Competition," International Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 4(4), pages 343-378, December.
- Daniel Diermeier & Michael Keane & Antonio Merlo, 2005.
"A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 347-373, March.
- Daniel Diermeier & Michael Keane & Antonio Merlo, 2004. "A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers," Discussion Papers 1387, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Daniel Diermeier & Michael Keane & Antonio Merlo, 2002. "A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers," PIER Working Paper Archive 04-037, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Sep 2004.
- Merlo, Antonio, 1996.
"Bargaining over governments in a stochastic environment,"
7476, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center.
- Merlo, Antonio, 1997. "Bargaining over Governments in a Stochastic Environment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 101-31, February.
- J.S. Cramer, 1998. "Predictive Performance of the Binary Logit Model in Unbalanced Samples," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 98-085/4, Tinbergen Institute.
- Daniel Diermeier & Hulya Eraslan & Antonio Merlo, 2003. "A Structural Model of Government Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(1), pages 27-70, January.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Gabriel Mihalache).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.