AbstractThe budget forms the legal basis for government spending, and timely budgets, enacted before the new fiscal year, are an integral part of good governance. This paper examines the causes of late budgets using a unique dataset of budget completion dates for US state governments 1988-2007, constructed from news reports and state budget office surveys. We find 23 percent of state budgets to be late. We show that changing economic circumstances and divided government are the driving forces behind late budgets, which is consistent with a war-of-attrition bargaining model featuring budget baselines and preferences over deviations from such baselines. (JEL C78, D72, H61, H72)
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Journal: Economic Policy.
Volume (Year): 4 (2012)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Other versions of this item:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems
- H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
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- Asger Lau Andersen & David Dreyer Lassen & Lasse Holbøll Westh Nielsen, 2010. "The Impact of Fiscal Governance on Bond Markets: Evidence from Late Budgets and State Government Borrowing Costs," EPRU Working Paper Series 2010-11, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Andreas Bernecker, 2014. "Divided We Reform? Evidence from US Welfare Policies," CESifo Working Paper Series 4564, CESifo Group Munich.
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