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Market Failures and Public Policy

Author

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  • Tirole, Jean

    (Toulouse 1 Capitole University)

Abstract

Jean Tirole delivered his Prize Lecture on 8 December 2014 at the Aula Magna, Stockholm University.

Suggested Citation

  • Tirole, Jean, 2014. "Market Failures and Public Policy," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2014-3, Nobel Prize Committee.
    • Handle: RePEc:ris:nobelp:2014_003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Caillaud, Bernard & Jullien, Bruno, 2003. "Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(2), pages 309-328, Summer.
    2. Xavier Freixas & Roger Guesnerie & Jean Tirole, 1985. "Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 52(2), pages 173-191.
    3. Carl Shapiro, 2001. "Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting," NBER Chapters, in: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 1, pages 119-150, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Aleksandra Boutin, 2016. "Screening for Good Patent Pools through Price Caps on Individual Licenses," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 64-94, August.
    5. Benjamin Edelman & Julian Wright, 2015. "Price Coherence and Excessive Intermediation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 130(3), pages 1283-1328.
    6. Mark Armstrong & John Vickers, 2000. "Multiproduct Price Regulation Under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(2), pages 137-160, June.
    7. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
    8. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 2002. "Cooperation Among Competitors: Some Economics Of Payment Card Associations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(4), pages 549-570, Winter.
    9. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1990. "The regulation of multiproduct firms : Part II: Applications to competitive environments and policy analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 37-66, October.
    10. Loeb, Martin & Magat, Wesley A, 1979. "A Decentralized Method for Utility Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 399-404, October.
    11. Armstrong, Mark & Vickers, John, 2000. "Multiproduct Price Regulation under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(2), pages 137-160, June.
    12. Ilya Segal, 1999. "Contracting with Externalities," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(2), pages 337-388.
    13. David Sappington, 1982. "Optimal Regulation of Research and Development under Imperfect Information," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 354-368, Autumn.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Market Power;

    JEL classification:

    • D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General

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