Screening for Good Patent Pools through Price Caps on Individual Licenses
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- Aleksandra Boutin, 2016. "Screening for Good Patent Pools through Price Caps on Individual Licenses," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 64-94, August.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, 2019.
"Price Caps as Welfare-Enhancing Coopetition,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 127(6), pages 3018-3069.
- Rey, Patrick & Tirole, Jean, 2013. "Price Caps as Welfare-Enhancing Coopetition," TSE Working Papers 13-439, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jan 2018.
- Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, 2019. "Price caps as welfare-enhancing coopetition," Post-Print hal-03270038, HAL.
- Jean Tirole, 2015.
"Market Failures and Public Policy,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(6), pages 1665-1682, June.
- Tirole, Jean, 2014. "Market Failures and Public Policy," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2014-3, Nobel Prize Committee.
- Ishihara, Akifumi & Yanagawa, Noriyuki, 2018. "Dark sides of patent pools with independent licensing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 1-34.
- Gerard Llobet & Jorge Padilla, 2016.
"The Inverse Cournot Effect in Royalty Negotiations with Complementary Patents,"
Working Papers
wp2016_1608, CEMFI.
- Llobet, Gerard & Padilla, Jorge, 2016. "The Inverse Cournot Effect in Royalty Negotiations with Complementary Patents," CEPR Discussion Papers 11624, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Jay Pil Choi & Heiko Gerlach, 2015.
"Patent pools, litigation, and innovation,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(3), pages 499-523, September.
- Jay Pil Choi & Heiko Gerlach, 2013. "Patent Pools, Litigation and Innovation," CESifo Working Paper Series 4429, CESifo.
- Tesoriere, Antonio, 2019. "Stable sharing rules and participation in pools of essential patents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 40-58.
- Lampert, Hodaya & Wettstein, David, 2020. "Patents and pools in pyramidal innovation structures," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
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More about this item
Keywords
technology licensing; patent pools; substitutes and complements; independent licensing; price caps; joint marketing;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- M20 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics - - - General
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2014-04-05 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-INO-2014-04-05 (Innovation)
- NEP-IPR-2014-04-05 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-LAW-2014-04-05 (Law and Economics)
- NEP-MKT-2014-04-05 (Marketing)
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