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Autobiography

Author

Listed:
  • Roth, Alvin E.

    (Harvard University)

Abstract

I was born on December 18, 1951 in the New York City borough of Queens. My parents, Ernest and Lillian, were both public high school teachers of a subject that is probably no longer taught, called Secretarial Studies, which focused on typing and taking dictation via two methods of shorthand stenography, Pitman and Gregg. Their students were young women planning to go directly to work as secretaries after high school.

Suggested Citation

  • Roth, Alvin E., 2013. "Autobiography," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2012-7, Nobel Prize Committee.
    • Handle: RePEc:ris:nobelp:2012_007
    as

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    File URL: http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2012/roth-bio.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2005. "The New York City High School Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 364-367, May.
    2. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2009. "Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the New York City High School Match," NBER Working Papers 14864, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2009. "Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1954-1978, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Market Design;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles

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