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Crédibilité en matière de ciblage d'inflation

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  • Gürbüz Beşek, Yeşim

    ()
    (Galatasaray University Economic Research Center)

Abstract

Le ciblage d’inflation est une politique basée sur l’annonce d’une cible d’inflation et un engagement à respecter à cette cible annoncée par la Banque Centrale et sur une stratégie de communication et de transparence, d’où la cible d’inflation est l’objectif final de la politique monétaire. C’est aussi une politique qui permet de résoudre le problème de la crédibilité. Dans ce travail, on essaye de voir en quoi la politique de ciblage d’inflation consiste à améliorer le degré de la crédibilité. Pour ce faire, à la lumière de la revue de la littérature sur la crédibilité, on montre théoriquement qu’il s’agit d’une politique monétaire qui évite le biais inflationniste et qui combine différentes mesures permettant l’amélioration de la crédibilité.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Galatasaray University Economic Research Center in its series GIAM Working Papers with number 11-1.

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Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: 08 Feb 2011
Date of revision: 08 Feb 2011
Handle: RePEc:ris:giamwp:2011_001

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Keywords: Politique monétaire; ciblage d’inflation; crédibilité; jeux non coopératifs;

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