The Incentive to Invest in Environmental-Friendly Technologies: Dynamics Makes a Difference
AbstractThe established view on oligopolistic competition with environmental externalities has it that, since firms neglect the external effect, their incentive to invest in R&D for pollution abatement is nil unless they are subject to some form of environmental taxation. We take a dynamic approach to this issue, using a simple differential game to show that the conclusion reached by the static literature is not robust, as the introduction of dynamics shows that firms do invest in R&D for environmental-friendly technologies throughout the game, as long as R&D is accompanied by an output restriction exhibiting a distinctively collusive flavour. We also examine the social planning case and the effects of Pigouvian taxation, to show that there exists a feasible tax rate inducing profit-seeking firms to choose a combination of output and R&D such that the resulting social welfare level is the same as in the first best
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis in its series Working Paper Series with number 21_09.
Date of creation: Jan 2009
Date of revision: Jan 2009
pollution; environmental externality; R&D; differential games; social planning;
Other versions of this item:
- D. Dragone & L. Lambertini & A. Palestini, 2009. "The Incentive to Invest in Environmental-Friendly Technologies: Dynamics Makes a Difference," Working Papers 658, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
- Q55 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Technological Innovation
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