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Managing the Risks of Shale Gas Development Using Innovative Legal and Regulatory Approaches

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  • Olmstead, Sheila

    (Resources for the Future)

  • Richardson, Nathan

    (Resources for the Future)

Abstract

Booming production of oil and gas from shale, enabled by hydraulic fracturing technology, has led to tension between hoped-for economic benefits and feared environmental and other costs, with great associated controversy. Study of how policy can best react to these challenges and how it can balance risk and reward has focused on prescriptive regulatory responses and, to a somewhat lesser extent, voluntary industry best practices. While there is undoubtedly room for improved regulation, innovative tools are relatively understudied. The liability system predates environmental regulation yet still plays an important—and in some senses predominant—role. Changes to that system, including burden-shifting rules and increased bond requirements, might improve outcomes. Similarly, new regulation can and should incorporate modern understanding of the benefits of market-based approaches. Information disclosure requirements can benefit the liability system and have independent benefits of their own. Policymakers faced with a need for policy change in reaction to shale development should carefully consider alternatives to regulation and, when regulation is deemed necessary, consider which tool is best suited.

Suggested Citation

  • Olmstead, Sheila & Richardson, Nathan, 2014. "Managing the Risks of Shale Gas Development Using Innovative Legal and Regulatory Approaches," RFF Working Paper Series dp-14-15, Resources for the Future.
  • Handle: RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-14-15
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    File URL: http://www.rff.org/RFF/documents/RFF-DP-14-15.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Backstrom, Jesse, 2019. "Strategic Reporting and the Effects of Water Use in Hydraulic Fracturing on Local Groundwater Levels in Texas," Center for Growth and Opportunity at Utah State University 307177, Center for Growth and Opportunity.
    2. Galinato, Gregmar I. & Chouinard, Hayley H., 2018. "Strategic interaction and institutional quality determinants of environmental regulations," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 114-132.
    3. Alan Krupnick, Nathan Richardson, and Madeline Gottlieb, 2015. "Heterogeneity of State Shale Gas Regulations," Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1).
    4. Cong Dong & Xiucheng Dong & Joel Gehman & Lianne Lefsrud, 2017. "Using BP Neural Networks to Prioritize Risk Management Approaches for China’s Unconventional Shale Gas Industry," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 9(6), pages 1-18, June.
    5. Corey Young, 2023. "Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Governing Unconventional Natural Gas at the Local Level in the United States," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(7), pages 1-14, March.
    6. Absar, Syeda Mariya & McManamay, Ryan A. & Preston, Benjamin L. & Taylor, Adam M., 2021. "Bridging global socioeconomic scenarios with policy adaptations to examine energy-water tradeoffs," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 149(C).

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    Keywords

    shale; shale gas; liability; market-based tools; burden shifting; information;
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