The Limitations of Legal Institutions for Addressing Environmental Risks
AbstractThis article assesses the major systems of environmental liability in the United States—the toxic tort system and Superfund. The discussion of each of these areas first lays out the scientific background of the environmental problems and the applicable regulatory regime. It then analyzes the efficacy of these regimes for addressing environmental problems and suggests alternative institutional designs for better promoting the goals of equitable and cost-effective compensation of disease victims and efficient deterrence and remediation of environmental degradation.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Perspectives.
Volume (Year): 5 (1991)
Issue (Month): 3 (Summer)
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
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