Greenhouse Gas Regulation under the Clean Air Act: A Guide for Economists
AbstractUntil recently, most attention to U.S. climate policy has focused on legislative efforts to introduce a price on carbon through cap and trade. In the absence of such legislation, the Clean Air Act is a potentially potent alternative. Decisions regarding existing stationary sources will have the greatest effect on emissions reductions. The magnitude is uncertain, but plausibly 10 percent reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from 2005 levels could be achieved at moderate costs by 2020. This is comparable to the reductions that would have been achieved under the Waxman-Markey legislation in the domestic economy. These measures do not include the switching of fuels, which could yield further reductions. The ultimate cost of regulation under the act hinges on the stringency of standards and the flexibility allowed. A broad-based tradable performance standard is legally plausible and would provide incentives comparable to the proposed legislation, at least in the near term.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Resources For the Future in its series Discussion Papers with number dp-11-08.
Date of creation: 09 Feb 2011
Date of revision:
climate policy; efficiency; EPA; Clean Air Act; NAAQS; coal;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-02-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2011-02-26 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2011-02-26 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2011-02-26 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-REG-2011-02-26 (Regulation)
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