Voluntary Environmental Agreements when Regulatory Capacity Is Weak
AbstractVoluntary agreements (VAs) negotiated between environmental regulators and industry are increasingly popular. However, little is known about whether they are likely to be effective in developing and transition countries, where local and federal environmental regulatory capacity is typically weak. We develop a dynamic theoretical model to examine the effect of VAs on investment in regulatory infrastructure and pollution abatement in such countries. We find that under certain conditions, VAs can improve welfare by generating more private-sector investment in pollution control and more public-sector investment in regulatory capacity than the status quo.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Resources For the Future in its series Discussion Papers with number dp-06-30.
Date of creation: 03 Jul 2006
Date of revision:
voluntary environmental regulation; developing country;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
- O13 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2006-09-03 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2006-09-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2006-09-03 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2006-09-03 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-REG-2006-09-03 (Regulation)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Baron, David P., 1989. "Design of regulatory mechanisms and institutions," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 24, pages 1347-1447 Elsevier.
- Anna Alberini & Kathleen Segerson, 2002. "Assessing Voluntary Programs to Improve Environmental Quality," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 22(1), pages 157-184, June.
- Matthieu Glachant, 2003. "Voluntary Agreements under Endogenous Legislative Threats," Working Papers 2003.36, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Segerson, Kathleen & Miceli, Thomas J., 1998. "Voluntary Environmental Agreements: Good or Bad News for Environmental Protection?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 109-130, September.
- Thomas P. Lyon & John W. Maxwell, 2008.
"Corporate Social Responsibility and the Environment: A Theoretical Perspective,"
Review of Environmental Economics and Policy,
Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 240-260, Summer.
- Thomas P. Lyon & John W. Maxwell, 2007. "Corporate Social Responsibility and the Environment: A Theoretical Perspective," Working Papers 2007-16, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
- Kalim Shah & Jorge Rivera, 2007.
"Export processing zones and corporate environmental performance in emerging economies: The case of the oil, gas, and chemical sectors of Trinidad and Tobago,"
Springer, vol. 40(4), pages 265-285, December.
- Kalim Shah & Jorge Rivera, 2008. "Export processing zones and corporate environmental performance in emerging economies: The case of the oil, gas, and chemical sectors of Trinidad and Tobago," Policy Sciences, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 181-182, June.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Webmaster).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.