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Informational Fragility of Dynamic Rational Expectations Equilibria

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  • Giacomo Rondina

    (University of California, San Diego)

Abstract

We study the stability properties of Rational Expectations equilibria in dynamic models with incomplete information when the information set of agents is slightly perturbed. We show that equilibria where the endogenous variables resolve the information incompleteness can be informationally fragile, in the sense that a slight perturbation in the endogenous information set of the agents along the equilibrium path can lead to a break-down of the equilibrium dynamics. We then construct a class of dynamic rational expectations equilibria that are informationally stable for the same parameter space where other equilibria are informationally fragile. We show that an equilibrium that is informationally fragile is not least-squares learnable, while an equilibrium that is informationally stable always is. We finally present an application to a macroeconomic equilibrium model with productivity shocks and nominal rigidities under incomplete information that shows that both informationally fragile and stable equilibria can be obtained, with quite different shocks propagation properties.

Suggested Citation

  • Giacomo Rondina, 2013. "Informational Fragility of Dynamic Rational Expectations Equilibria," 2013 Meeting Papers 83, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  • Handle: RePEc:red:sed013:83
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Christian Hellwig, 2002. "Public Announcements, Adjustment Delays, and the Business Cycle (November 2002)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 208, UCLA Department of Economics.
    2. Townsend, Robert M, 1983. "Forecasting the Forecasts of Others," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 546-588, August.
    3. Guido Lorenzoni, 2009. "A Theory of Demand Shocks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 2050-2084, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Thistle, John G. & Miller, Daniel E., 2016. "No free lunch: Fundamental tradeoffs in macroeconomic policy," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 104-121.
    2. Rondina, Giacomo & Walker, Todd B., 2013. "A note on Futia (1981)’s non-existence pathology of rational expectations equilibria," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 177-180.

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