This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

• NEP-ALL-2005-12-01 (All new papers)
• NEP-DGE-2005-12-01 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
• NEP-FIN-2005-12-01 (Finance)
• NEP-MAC-2005-12-01 (Macroeconomics)

1. Eaton, Jonathan & Gersovitz, Mark, 1981. "Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(2), pages 289-309, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Marcet, Albert & Marimon, Ramon, 1992. "Communication, commitment, and growth," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 219-249, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Albert Marcet & Ramon Marimon, 1991. "Communication, Commitment and Growth," Economics Working Papers 1, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
   • Albert Marcet & Ramon Marimon, 1992. "Communication, commitment, and growth," Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics 74, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
3. Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, 1998. "Private and Public Supply of Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(1), pages 1-40, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, 1996. "Private and Public Supply of Liquidity," NBER Working Papers 5817, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Holmstrom, B & Tirole, J, 1996. "Private and Public Supply of Liquidity," Working papers 96-21, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
4. Christopher Phelan & Ennio Stacchetti, 2001. "Sequential Equilibria in a Ramsey Tax Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(6), pages 1491-1518, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Christopher Phelan & Ennio Stacchetti, 1999. "Sequential equilibria in a Ramsey tax model," Staff Report 258, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
5. Bernanke, Ben & Gertler, Mark, 1989. "Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 14-31, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Anil K. Kashyap & Jeremy C. Stein, 2000. "What Do a Million Observations on Banks Say about the Transmission of Monetary Policy?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(3), pages 407-428, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, 1993. "Did risk-based capital allocate bank credit and cause a credit crunch in the U.S.?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 93-41, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
   Other versions:
   • Allen Berger & Gregory Udell, 1994. "Did Risk-Based Capital Allocate Bank Credit and Cause a `Credit Crunch' in the U.S.?," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 94-07, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
8. Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2000. "A Theory of Bank Capital," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(6), pages 2431-2465, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 1999. "A Theory of Bank Capital," NBER Working Papers 7431, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, . "A Theory of Bank Capital," CRSP working papers 363, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
9. Thomas, J. & Worrall, T., 1990. "Foreign Direct Investment And The Risk Of Expropriation," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 342, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
   Other versions:
   • Thomas, J. & Worral, T., 1991. "Foreign Direcyt Investment and the Risk of Expropriation," Papers 9126, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
   • Thomas, Jonathan & Worrall, Tim, 1994. "Foreign Direct Investment and the Risk of Expropriation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 61(1), pages 81-108, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Thomas Cooley & Ramon Marimon & Vincenzo Quadrini, 2003. "Aggregate Consequences of Limited Contract Enforceability," NBER Working Papers 10132, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Thomas Cooley & Ramon Marimon & Vicenzo Quadrini, 1999. "Aggregate Consequences of Limited Contract Enforceability," Economics Working Papers 843, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Oct 2003. [Downloadable!]
    • Cooley, Thomas F & Marimon, Ramon & Quadrini, Vincenzo, 2004. "Aggregate Consequences of Limited Contract Enforceability," CEPR Discussion Papers 4173, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • Thomas Cooley & Ramon Marimon & Vincenzo Quadrini, 2004. "Aggregate Consequences of Limited Contract Enforceability," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(4), pages 817-847, August.
11. Allen, Franklin, 1983. "Credit Rationing and Payment Incentives," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 50(4), pages 639-46, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Petersen, Mitchell A & Rajan, Raghuram G, 1995. "The Effect of Credit Market Competition on Lending Relationships," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(2), pages 407-43, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Mitchell A. Petersen & Raghuram G. Rajan, 1994. "The Effect of Credit Market Competition on Lending Relationships," NBER Working Papers 4921, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Kehoe, Timothy J & Levine, David K, 1993. "Debt-Constrained Asset Markets," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 60(4), pages 865-88, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine, 1992. "Debt constrained asset markets," Working Papers 445, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
    • Timothy J Kehoe & David K Levine, 1993. "Debt Constrained Asset Markets," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1276, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
14. Steven A. Sharpe, 1995. "Bank capitalization, regulation, and the credit crunch: a critical review of the research findings," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 95-20, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
15. Allen, Franklin & Gale, Douglas, 1997. "Financial Markets, Intermediaries, and Intertemporal Smoothing," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(3), pages 523-46, June.
    Other versions:
    • Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 1995. "Financial Markets, Intermediaries, and Intertemporal Smoothing," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 95-02, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
    • Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 1995. "Financial markets, intermediaries, and intertemporal smoothing," Working Papers 95-4, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    • Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 1996. "Financial Markets, Intermediaries and Intertemporal Smoothing," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 96-33, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
16. Fernando Alvarez & Urban J. Jermann, 2000. "Efficiency, Equilibrium, and Asset Pricing with Risk of Default," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(4), pages 775-798, July.
17. Thomas, Jonathan & Worrall, Tim, 1988. "Self-enforcing Wage Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(4), pages 541-54, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
18. Thakor, Anjan V, 1996. " Capital Requirements, Monetary Policy, and Aggregate Bank Lending: Theory and Empirical Evidence," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(1), pages 279-324, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
19. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1989. "Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 43-50, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Jeremy I. Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, 1988. "Sovereign Debt: Is To Forgive To Forget?," NBER Working Papers 2623, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • Bulow, J. & Rogoff, K., 1988. "Sovereign Debt: Is To Forgive To Forget?," Papers 411, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
20. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
21. Boot, Arnoud W A & Greenbaum, Stuart I & Thakor, Anjan V, 1993. "Reputation and Discretion in Financial Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1165-83, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
22. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1983. "Incentive Effects of Terminations: Applications to the Credit and Labor Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(5), pages 912-27, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
23. Holmstrom, Bengt & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and the Real Sector," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(3), pages 663-91, August.
    Other versions:
    • Holmström, Bengt & Tirole, Jean, 1994. "Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds and the Real Sector," IDEI Working Papers 40, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    • Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, 1994. "Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds and the Real Sector," Working papers 95-1, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
24. Rui Albuquerque & Hugo Hopenhayn, 2002. "Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics," RCER Working Papers 493, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Rui Albuquerque & Hugo A. Hopenhayn, 2004. "Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 71(2), pages 285-315, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
25. Hoshi, Takeo & Kashyap, Anil & Scharfstein, David, 1990. "The role of banks in reducing the costs of financial distress in Japan," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 67-88, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Takeo Hoshi & Anil Kashyap & David Scharfstein, 1990. "The Role of Banks in Reducing the Costs of Financial Distress in Japan," NBER Working Papers 3435, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
26. Ben S. Bernanke & Cara S. Lown, 1991. "The Credit Crunch," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 22(1991-2), pages 205-248. [Downloadable!]
27. Takeo Hoshi & Anil Kashyap & David Scharfstein, 1990. "Bank Monitoring and Investment: Evidence from the Changing Structure of Japanese Corporate Banking Relationships," NBER Chapters, in: Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment, pages 105-126 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Takeo Hoshi & Anil Kashyap & David Scharfstein, 1989. "Bank Monitoring and Investment: Evidence from the Changing Structure of Japanese Corporate Banking Relationships," NBER Working Papers 3079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
28. Bolton, Patrick & Scharfstein, David S, 1990. "A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 93-106, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
29. Hoshi, Takeo & Kashyap, Anil & Scharfstein, David, 1991. "Corporate Structure, Liquidity, and Investment: Evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(1), pages 33-60, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Takeo Hoshi & Anil Kashyap & David Scharfstein, 1989. "Corporate structure, liquidity, and investment: evidence from Japanese industrial groups," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 82, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
30. J. G. Haubrich, . "Financial Intermediation: Delegated Monitoring and Long-Term Relationships," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 9-86, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
    Other versions:
    • J.G. Haubrich, . "Financial Intermediation: Delegated Monitoring and Long-Term Relationships," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 09-86, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
    • Haubrich, Joseph G., 1989. "Financial intermediation : Delegated monitoring and long-term relationships," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 9-20, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
31. Takeo Hoshi & Anil Kashyap & David Scharfstein, 1989. "Bank monitoring and investment: evidence from the changing structure of Japanese corporate banking relations," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 86, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
32. Phelan Christopher, 1995. "Repeated Moral Hazard and One-Sided Commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 488-506, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
33. Debraj Ray, 2002. "The Time Structure of Self-Enforcing Agreements," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(2), pages 547-582, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)