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Monetary Policy and Real Stabilization

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Author Info
Lars E.O. Svensson (Princeton University, CEPR and NBER)

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Abstract

Monetary policy can achieve average inflation equal to a given inflation target and, at best, a good compromise between inflation variability and output-gap variability. The complex transmission mechanism, varying lags and strength of the effects through different channels, unpredictable shocks and inherent uncertainty prevent any fine-tuning. Monetary policy cannot completely stabilize either inflation or the output gap. Increased credibility in the form of inflation expectations anchored on the inflation target will reduce the variability of inflation and the output gap. Central banks can improve transparency and accountability by specifying not only an inflation target but also the dislike of output-gap variability relative to inflation variability. This will better focus the work inside the bank, allow more precise external monitoring and evaluation of monetary policy, and allow more precise scrutiny and debate about the monetary-policy objectives. Central banks can best achieve both the long-run inflation target and the best compromise between inflation and output-gap stability by engaging in “forecast targeting,” where at each major monetary-policy decision, the bank selects the feasible combination of inflation and output-gap projections that minimize the loss function and the corresponding instrument-rate plan and sets the instrument-rate accordingly. Announcing and motivating these forecasts maximize the impact on private-sector expectations and the economy and make the implementation of policy most effective. This allows the most effective external monitoring and evaluation of the policy, and thereby creates the strongest incentives for the bank to conduct policy according to the announced objectives. It also allows precise debate about the monetary-policy objectives. Forecast targeting implies that the instrument responds to all information that significantly affects the projections of inflation and the output gap. Therefore it cannot be expressed in terms of a simple instrument rule, like a Taylor rule. Financial stability, including a well-functioning payment system, is an important additional objective for the central bank. This objective can conveniently be considered as a restriction on monetary policy that does not bind in normal times, but does bind in times of financial crises. By producing and publishing Financial Stability Reports with indicators of financial stability, the central bank can monitor the degree of financial stability and issue warnings to concerned agents and authorities in due time and this way avoid deteriorating financial stability. Forecast targeting implies that asset-price developments and potential asset-price bubbles are taken into account and responded to the extent that they are deemed to affect the projections of the target variables, inflation and the output gap. In most cases, it will be difficult to make precise judgments, though, especially to identify bubbles with reasonable certainty. The zero bound, liquidity traps and risks of deflation are serious concerns for a monetary policy aimed at low inflation. Forecast targeting with a symmetric positive inflation target keeps the risk of the zero bound, liquidity traps and deflation small. Prudent central banks may want to prepare in advance contingency plans for situations when a series of bad shocks substantially increases the risk of falling into a liquidity trap, as well as contingency plans escaping from a liquidity trap. An open economy can use the foolproof way of escaping from a liquidity trap, with a price level target, a currency depreciation and a temporary exchange rate peg, and an exit strategy with a shift to inflation target when the price-level target has been reached. This applies, in particular, to Japan, where not following the foolproof way could imply another lost decade.

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Paper provided by Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies. in its series Working Papers with number 119.

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Date of creation: Sep 2002
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Handle: RePEc:pri:cepsud:119

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Related research
Keywords: Flexible inflation targeting output gap stabilization the foolproof way

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

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    Other versions:
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    Other versions:
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    Other versions:
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    Other versions:
  7. Ben S. Bernanke & Mark Gertler, 2001. "Should Central Banks Respond to Movements in Asset Prices?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 253-257, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Svensson, Lars E O, 2000. "The Zero Bound in an Open Economy: A Foolproof Way of Escaping from a Liquidity Trap," CEPR Discussion Papers 2566, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Lars E. O. Svensson, 2003. "What Is Wrong with Taylor Rules? Using Judgment in Monetary Policy through Targeting Rules," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(2), pages 426-477, June.
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  15. Professor Lars E O Svensson, 2001. "Independent review of the operation of monetary policy in New Zealand," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 64, March. [Downloadable!]
  16. Lars E.O. Svensson & Kjetil Houg & Haakon O.Aa. Solheim & Erling Steigum, 2002. "An Independent Review of Monetary Policy and Institutions in Norway," Working Papers 120, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies.. [Downloadable!]
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  24. Svensson, Lars E O & Woodford, Michael, 2004. "Implementing Optimal Policy Through Inflation-Forecast Targeting," CEPR Discussion Papers 4229, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  25. Gaspar, Vitor & Smets, Frank, 2002. "Monetary Policy, Price Stability and Output Gap Stabilization," International Finance, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 5(2), pages 193-211, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  27. Batini, Nicoletta & Nelson, Edward, 2001. "Optimal horizons for inflation targeting," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(6-7), pages 891-910, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  28. Ben Bernanke & Mark Gertler, 1999. "Monetary policy and asset price volatility," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 77-128. [Downloadable!]
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  30. Charles A.E. Goodhart, 2001. "Monetary transmission lags and the formulation of the policy decision on interest rates," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jul, pages 165-186. [Downloadable!]
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Arminio Fraga & Ilan Goldfajn & Andre Minella, 2003. "Inflation Targeting in Emerging Market Economies," NBER Working Papers 10019, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Leopold von Thadden, 2004. "Active monetary policy, passive fiscal policy and the value of pure debt: some further monetarist arithmetic," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2003 108, Money Macro and Finance Research Group. [Downloadable!]
  3. Luis Felipe Céspedes & Ilan Goldfajn & Phil Lowe & Rodrigo Valdés, 2005. "Policy Responses to External Shocks: The Experiences of Australia, Brazil and Chile," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 321, Central Bank of Chile. [Downloadable!]
  4. Gianni Amisano & Marco Tronzano, 2005. "Assessing ECB?s Credibility During the First Years of the Eurosystem: A Bayesian Empirical Investigation," Working Papers ubs0512, University of Brescia, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Lars E. O. Svensson, 2003. "What is Wrong with Taylor Rules? Using Judgment in Monetary Policy through Targeting Rules," NBER Working Papers 9421, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Pelin Ilbas, 2008. "Estimation of monetary policy preferences in a forward-looking model : a Bayesian approach," Research series 200803-12, National Bank of Belgium. [Downloadable!]
  7. Kenneth Lewis & Laurence Seidman, 2005. " Can Fiscal Stimulus Overcome the Zero Interest-Rate Bound?: A Quantitative Assessment," Working Papers 05-19, University of Delaware, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Demosthenes N. Tambakis, 2007. "Fear of Floating and Social Welfare," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 3(3), pages 183-204, September. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Lars E.O. Svensson, 2003. "Escaping from a Liquidity Trap and Deflation: The Foolproof Way and Others," NBER Working Papers 10195, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Sergio Destefanis, 2003. "Measuring macroeconomic performance through a non-parametric Taylor curve," CSEF Working Papers 95, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Salerno, Italy. [Downloadable!]
  11. Kirsten Lommatzsch & Silke Tober, 2004. "The Inflation Target of the ECB: Does the Balassa-Samuelson Effect Matter?," EUI-RSCAS Working Papers 19, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS). [Downloadable!]
  12. Svensson, Lars E O, 2004. "Optimal Policy with Low-Probability Extreme Events," CEPR Discussion Papers 4218, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. Feridun, M. & Adebiyi, M.A., 2006. "Forecasting Inflation in Developing Economies: The Case of Nigeria, 1986-1998," International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies, Euro-American Association of Economic Development, vol. 3(1), pages 55-84. [Downloadable!]
  14. Carvalho, Alexandre & Moura, Marcelo L., 2008. "What Can Taylor Rules Say About Monetary Policy in Latin America?," Ibmec Working Papers wpe_124, Ibmec Working Paper, Ibmec São Paulo. [Downloadable!]
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  17. Athanasios Orphanides & John C. Williams, 2003. "Imperfect Knowledge, Inflation Expectations, and Monetary Policy," CFS Working Paper Series 2003/40, Center for Financial Studies. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  18. Kenneth Lewis & Laurence Seidman, 2005. "A Tax Rebate in A Recession: Is It Safe and Effective?," Working Papers 05-20, University of Delaware, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  19. Preston J. Miller & Gary H. Stern, 2004. "Avoiding significant monetary policy mistakes," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Dec, pages 2-9. [Downloadable!]
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