Licensing probabilistic Patents: The duopoly case
AbstractIn this work we study licensing games of non drastic innovations under the shadow of probabilistic patents. We study the situation of a insider innovator that get a new reduction cost innovation and acts in a duopoly market under Cournout competition. When the property rights are not ironclad the potential licensee additional to the option of use the backstop technology instead of the new technology ,has the option of infringe the patent. Under infringement the patent holder can sue the infringer in a court and if its successful could get a order of damages payment. Then when the infringer decides about what kind of technology to use the infringement is always better than to use the backstop technology then a difference of the ironclad licensing games probabilistic rights, change the threats points and makes attractive for the patent holder just to license big innovations under the Lost Profit rule.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 9925.
Date of creation: Aug 2008
Date of revision:
Patents; innovation economics; probabilistic property rights; damage rules;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L0 - Industrial Organization - - General
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-08-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2008-08-14 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2008-08-14 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-INO-2008-08-14 (Innovation)
- NEP-IPR-2008-08-14 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-LAW-2008-08-14 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2008-08-14 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-TID-2008-08-14 (Technology & Industrial Dynamics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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