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Market Structure and Organizational Form

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  • Zhou, Haiwen

Abstract

This paper studies the determinants of a firm’s organizational form in the context of an imperfectly competitive industry. There are two kinds of organizational forms: the multi-divisional form (M-form) and the unitary form (U-form). An M-form firm suffers from ignorance of demand externalities among different products and double marginalization is eliminated. In contrast, in a U-form firm, demand externalities are taken into consideration and double marginalization exists. A firm’s optimal choice of organizational form depends on the market structure.

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  • Zhou, Haiwen, 2019. "Market Structure and Organizational Form," MPRA Paper 96882, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:96882
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Kangsik Choi, 2022. "Organizational form and multiple exportable goods in export rivalry trade," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 90(5), pages 565-586, September.
    2. Binglin Gong & Haiwen Zhou, 2023. "The choice of technology and international trade," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(7), pages 1035-1057, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Organizational form; market structure; oligopoly; multi-divisional form; unitary form;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production

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