Delegation and Commitment in Durable Goods Monopolies
AbstractThis paper studies a simultaneous-move infinite-horizon delegation game in which the principal of a durable goods monopoly entrusts pricing decisions to a manager who enjoys consuming her monetary rewards but dislikes production effort. The delegation contract allows for continual interference with managerial incentives: in each period the principal rewards the manager according to her performance. We show that when the cost of delegation is low relative to profits, the principal can attain the precommitment price plan in a perfect rational expectations equilibrium. The paper analyzes the robustness of this result under alternative specifications of timing and objectives. We also provide a numerical characterization of the equilibrium strategies for the case of linear-quadratic payoffs.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 336.
Date of creation: 01 Aug 2007
Date of revision:
Durable Goods Monopoly; Delegation; Perfect Rational Expectations Equilibrium;
Other versions of this item:
- Coury, Tarek & Petkov, Vladimir P., 2008. "Delegation and commitment in durable goods monopolies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 41-55, May.
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Monopoly
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-08-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2007-08-14 (Business Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2007-08-14 (Microeconomics)
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