Three-sided matchings and separable preferences
AbstractIn this paper we provide sufficient conditions for the existence stable matchings for three-sided systems.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 8660.
Date of creation: 08 May 2008
Date of revision:
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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- Roth, Alvin E. & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1992.
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier,
in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 485-541
- Danilov, V. I., 2003. "Existence of stable matchings in some three-sided systems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 145-148, October.
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