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Property Regimes in Resource Conservation-A Framework for Analysis

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  • Hasan, Lubna

Abstract

This paper develops a conceptual framework for analysing property regimes in conservation of natural resources. Human beings interaction with their environment is governed through institutions of property; therefore they play an important role in the conservation of natural resources. This paper uses concepts from the New Institutional Economics School of thought and from theories of property to develop normative criteria to assess property institutions in resource management.

Suggested Citation

  • Hasan, Lubna, 2000. "Property Regimes in Resource Conservation-A Framework for Analysis," MPRA Paper 7464, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:7464
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Elinor Ostrom & Roy Gardner, 1993. "Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons: Self-Governing Irrigation Systems Can Work," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 93-112, Fall.
    2. Douglass C. North, 1991. "Institutions," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 97-112, Winter.
    3. Tom Tietenberg, 1994. "Economics and Environmental Policy," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 427.
    4. Nabli, Mustapha K. & Nugent, Jeffrey B., 1989. "The New Institutional Economics and its applicability to development," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 17(9), pages 1333-1347, September.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Natural Resource Management; Property Intuitions;

    JEL classification:

    • P14 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Property Rights
    • Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General

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