This research note reports the results of a follow-up experiment conducted to validate an earlier experiment showing that if taxpayers overestimate the prevalence of tax evasion, their voluntary compliance can be increased by informing them about the true rate of cheating. The result confirms that tax compliance is influenced partly by social conformity with perceived social norms against cheating. The experiments were done by the Minnesota Department of Revenue in 1995 and 1996, but only the first experiment has been publicly reported to date (Coleman, 1996).
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number
5820.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments Z1 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
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