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The Minnesota income tax compliance experiment: State tax results

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  • Coleman, Stephen

Abstract

This report describes the Minnesota Income Tax Compliance Experiment conducted by the Minnesota Department of Revenue in 1995. The experiment tested alternative strategies to improve voluntary compliance with the state income tax. These strategies included: increased examination and auditing of tax returns with prior notice to taxpayers, enhanced services to taxpayers, information messages in letters sent to taxpayers, and a new M-1 tax form. About 47,000 taxpayers participated in the experiment. They were selected by random chance for the compliance strategies. The primary measures used to evaluate compliance strategies were change in reported income and change in reported state taxes paid from (tax year) 1993 to 1994. Changes in taxpayer groups subject to a compliance strategy were compared to changes in similar groups of taxpayes who were unaffected by the experiment (control groups).

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 4827.

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Date of creation: Apr 1996
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:4827

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Related research

Keywords: tax compliance; economic experiment; social norms;

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Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. Who cares if you don’t pay your taxes?
    by Guest blogger in Eval Central on 2013-12-19 11:30:08
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Cited by:
  1. Michael Hallsworth & John List & Robert Metcalfe & Ivo Vlaev, 2014. "The Behavioralist As Tax Collector: Using Natural Field Experiments to Enhance Tax Compliance," NBER Working Papers 20007, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Kogler, Christoph & Batrancea, Larissa & Nichita, Anca & Pantya, Jozsef & Belianin, Alexis & Kirchler, Erich, 2013. "Trust and power as determinants of tax compliance: Testing the assumptions of the slippery slope framework in Austria, Hungary, Romania and Russia," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 169-180.
  3. Coleman, Stephen, 2007. "The Minnesota Income Tax Compliance Experiment: Replication of the Social Norms Experiment," MPRA Paper 5820, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Wenzel, Michael, 2005. "Misperceptions of social norms about tax compliance: From theory to intervention," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 862-883, December.
  5. Telle, Kjetil, 2013. "Monitoring and enforcement of environmental regulations," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 24-34.
  6. Gonzalez, Fidel & Leipnik, Mark & Mazumder, Diya, 2013. "How much are urban residents in Mexico willing to pay for cleaner air?," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(03), pages 354-379, June.
  7. Kjetil Telle, 2012. "Monitoring and enforcement of environmental regulations. Lessons from a natural field experiment in Norway," Discussion Papers 680, Research Department of Statistics Norway.

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