Sticky wages, labor demand elasticity and rational unemployment
AbstractIn this paper we give a clear-cut explanation to the sluggish wage adjustments which are commonly experienced also in face of involuntary unemployment. We prove that unemployment may be the physiological outcome of rational decisions by competing workers who may find it optimal to ask higher wages than the full-employment ones. The key element driving the result is the slope (or elasticity) of labor demand schedule: in case of rigid labor demand, in fact, workers’ wage requests are kept high because of reduced unemployment opportunity costs. This contrasts with other approaches to the analysis of unemployment, where only the level of labor demand is considered. Impatience of working and effort required by the job are also showed to influence the degree of wage stickiness.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 53260.
Date of creation: 2014
Date of revision:
Sticky wages; involuntary unemployment; labor demand elasticity; game theory;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution
- J23 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Demand
- J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2014-02-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAB-2014-02-02 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-MAC-2014-02-02 (Macroeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Taylor, John B, 1979. "Staggered Wage Setting in a Macro Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(2), pages 108-13, May.
- Moen, Espen R, 1997.
"Competitive Search Equilibrium,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 385-411, April.
- Diamond, Peter A, 1982.
"Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(5), pages 881-94, October.
- Montgomery, James D, 1991. "Equilibrium Wage Dispersion and Interindustry Wage Differentials," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(1), pages 163-79, February.
- Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-44, June.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.