This paper studies the influence of bankruptcy law (depending on whether the law is pro-lenders or pro-borrowers) on the borrowers propensity to demand the renegotiation of their debt, when there exist an asymmetrical information between lenders and borrowers. In the tradition of Law & Economics, we proceed to a study of impact for the main parameters of the model that capture the design of bankruptcy law, showing their influence on the probability of strategic bankruptcy and on the social welfare.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number
4805.
Find related papers by JEL classification: K0 - Law and Economics - - General G0 - Financial Economics - - General G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General K35 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Personal Bankruptcy Law K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law G29 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Other
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: