Renégociation stratégique de la dette, risque comptable et risque juridique
[Strategic Bankruptcy with accountable and judicial risks]
AbstractThis paper studies the influence of bankruptcy law (depending on whether the law is pro-lenders or pro-borrowers) on the borrowers propensity to demand the renegotiation of their debt, when there exist an asymmetrical information between lenders and borrowers. In the tradition of Law & Economics, we proceed to a study of impact for the main parameters of the model that capture the design of bankruptcy law, showing their influence on the probability of strategic bankruptcy and on the social welfare.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 4805.
Date of creation: 09 Jul 2007
Date of revision:
bankruptcy law; strategic debt repudiation; judicial risk and debt renegotiation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K0 - Law and Economics - - General
- G0 - Financial Economics - - General
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
- K35 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Personal Bankruptcy Law
- K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
- G29 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Other
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-09-16 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Bolton, Patrick & Scharfstein, David S, 1996. "Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(1), pages 1-25, February.
- Andrea Ichino & Michele Polo & Enrico Rettore, .
"Are Judges Biased by Labor Market Conditions?,"
192, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Povel, Paul, 1999. "Optimal "Soft" or "Tough" Bankruptcy Procedures," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(3), pages 659-84, October.
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