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A Normative Theory of Business Bankruptcy

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  • Alan Schwartz

    (Yale University)

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Paper provided by American Law & Economics Association in its series American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings with number 1037.

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Handle: RePEc:bep:alecam:1037

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  1. Che, Yeon-Koo & Schwartz, Alan, 1999. "Section 365, Mandatory Bankruptcy Rules and Inefficient Continuance," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(2), pages 441-67, July.
  2. Hudson, John, 1995. "The case against secured lending," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 47-63, January.
  3. Décamps, Jean Paul & Faure-Grimaud, Antoine, 2000. "Excessive continuation and Dynamic Agency Costs of Debt," CEPR Discussion Papers 2504, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Ghosal, Sayantan & Miller, Marcus, 2003. "Coordination Failure, Moral Hazard and Sovereign Bankruptcy Procedures," CEPR Discussion Papers 3729, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Ivo Welch & Arturo Bris & Alan Schwartz, 2003. "Who Should Pay for Bankruptcy Costs?," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm365, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Sep 2004.
  6. Bhattacharyya, Sugato & Singh, Rajdeep, 1999. "The resolution of bankruptcy by auction: allocating the residual right of design," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 269-294, December.
  7. Baird, Douglas G & Morrison, Edward R, 2001. "Bankruptcy Decision Making," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(2), pages 356-72, October.
  8. Dahiya, Sandeep & John, Kose & Puri, Manju & Ramirez, Gabriel, 2003. "Debtor-in-possession financing and bankruptcy resolution: Empirical evidence," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 259-280, July.
  9. Hotchkiss, Edith S. & Mooradian, Robert M., 1998. "Acquisitions as a Means of Restructuring Firms in Chapter 11," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 240-262, July.
  10. Aghion, P. & Hart, O. & Moore, J., 1992. "The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform," Working papers 92-11, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  11. Roberta DessÌ & Donald Robertson, 2003. "Debt, Incentives and Performance: Evidence from UK Panel Data," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(490), pages 903-919, October.
  12. Philippe Aghion & Peter Howitt & David Mayer-Foulkes, 2005. "The Effect of Financial Development on Convergence: Theory and Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 120(1), pages 173-222, January.
  13. Longhofer, Stanley D., 1997. "Absolute Priority Rule Violations, Credit Rationing, and Efficiency," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 249-267, July.
  14. Stanley D. Longhofer, 1997. "Absolute priority rule violations, credit rationing, and efficiency," Working Paper 9710, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  15. Oliver Hart, 2001. "Financial Contracting," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1924, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  16. Bergstrom, Clas & Eisenberg, Theodore & Sundgren, Stefan, 2002. "Secured debt and the likelihood of reorganization," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 359-372, May.
  17. Alderson, Michael J. & Betker, Brian L., 1995. "Liquidation costs and capital structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 45-69, September.
  18. Povel, Paul, 1999. "Optimal "Soft" or "Tough" Bankruptcy Procedures," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(3), pages 659-84, October.
  19. Eckbo, B Espen & Thorburn, Karin S, 2002. "Control Benefits and CEO Discipline in Automatic Bankruptcy Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 3481, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  20. Gilson, Stuart C, 1997. " Transactions Costs and Capital Structure Choice: Evidence from Financially Distressed Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(1), pages 161-96, March.
  21. Hotchkiss, Edith S. & Mooradian, Robert M., 2003. "Auctions in bankruptcy," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 9(5), pages 555-574, November.
  22. Michael C. Jensen, 1991. "Corporate Control And The Politics Of Finance," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 4(2), pages 13-34.
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Cited by:
  1. John Armour, 2006. "Should we redistribute in insolvency," ESRC Centre for Business Research - Working Papers wp319, ESRC Centre for Business Research.

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