A Normative Theory of Business Bankruptcy
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Paper provided by American Law & Economics Association in its series American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings with number 1037.Length:
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Handle: RePEc:bep:alecam:1037
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Citations
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- John Armour, 2006. "Should we redistribute in insolvency," ESRC Centre for Business Research - Working Papers wp319, ESRC Centre for Business Research.
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