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La asimetria de la informacion en la crisis financiera, el racionamiento del credito y la garantia como mecanismo simbiotico del sistema
[The information asymmetry in the financial crisis, credit rationing the guarantees and system simbiotic mechanism]

Author

Listed:
  • Gallurt, Jesus
  • Pombo, Pablo
  • Ramirez, Jesus
  • Molina, Horacio

Abstract

After the fall of Lehman Brothers and the start of the financial crisis is a break in economic activity, evidences a lack of financial attributed to information asymmetry experienced by the financial system. This paper will see how it has been analyzed by different economists this phenomenon that makes credit rationing and moral hazard. This issue is more severe because banking regulation establishes strict coverage criteria to operations that boost this exclusive effect. guarantee activity is beneficial for the entrepreneur and for financial institutions, finding common interests on them that, joined to the public sector, shape the guarantee activity as a policy that find the most effective coordination vectors between agents. However, test how the system no develops guarantee on the Spanish economy to achieve the desired volumes.

Suggested Citation

  • Gallurt, Jesus & Pombo, Pablo & Ramirez, Jesus & Molina, Horacio, 2012. "La asimetria de la informacion en la crisis financiera, el racionamiento del credito y la garantia como mecanismo simbiotico del sistema [The information asymmetry in the financial crisis, credit r," MPRA Paper 39773, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:39773
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    credit rationing; guarantee; loan; asimetry ; information asimmetryc;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H81 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Loans; Loan Guarantees; Credits; Grants; Bailouts

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