Empirical determinants of in-kind redistribution: Partisan biases and the role of inflation
AbstractThere is a dearth of research on the determinants of in-kind redistribution. Using dynamic panel data estimations for 32 OECD countries, we show that the in-kind share of social benefits is lower under left-wing governments. This effect is weakened when left-wing governments respond to inflation by increasing the share of in-kind transfers.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 38494.
Date of creation: 14 Mar 2012
Date of revision:
In-kind redistribution; social benefits; partisan biases; inflation;
Other versions of this item:
- Hessami, Zohal & Uebelmesser, Silke, 2013. "Empirical determinants of in-kind redistribution: Partisan biases and the role of inflation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(2), pages 318-320.
- Zohal Hessami & Silke Uebelmesser, 2012. "Empirical Determinants of In-kind Redistribution: Partisan Biases and the Role of Inflation," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2012-20, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
- H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
- E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
- I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-05-08 (All new papers)
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