IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/29314.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Fair value accounting and procyclicality: mitigating regulatory and accounting policy differences through regulatory structure reforms and Enforced Self Regulation

Author

Listed:
  • Ojo, Marianne

Abstract

In what ways can changes to the structure of regulation (as well as other regulatory reforms) mitigate the effects of policies which trigger financial instability? More specifically policies, information asymmetries or externalities which could give rise to bank contagion, systemic/liquidity risks or procyclical effects? Whilst acknowledging that accounting standards play a fundamental role in addressing problems which could contribute to information asymmetries and ultimately systemic risks, this paper also highlights why the type of regulatory structure, clear allocation of responsibilities between regulators, as well as measures aimed at fostering accountability, constitute vital elements which could serve as safeguards in mitigating procyclical effects (as well as other factors) which could trigger financial instability. In achieving this aim, the paper focusses on the rationale for fair value accounting, as well as problematic issues arising from its implementation. The adoption of international accounting standards is considered to have a vital role in contributing to financial stability. This paper will also illustrate how the implementation of accounting standards and policies, in certain instances, have contrasted with Basel Committee initiatives aimed at mitigating procyclicality and facilitating forward looking provisioning. More importantly, the paper will highlight how and why differences between regulatory and accounting policies could (and should) be mitigated.

Suggested Citation

  • Ojo, Marianne, 2011. "Fair value accounting and procyclicality: mitigating regulatory and accounting policy differences through regulatory structure reforms and Enforced Self Regulation," MPRA Paper 29314, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:29314
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/29314/1/MPRA_paper_29314.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Andrea Prat, 2005. "The Wrong Kind of Transparency," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 862-877, June.
    2. Laeven, Luc & Majnoni, Giovanni, 2003. "Loan loss provisioning and economic slowdowns: too much, too late?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 178-197, April.
    3. Rolf H. Weber, 2010. "Multilayered Governance in International Financial Regulation and Supervision," Journal of International Economic Law, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(3), pages 683-704, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jacques Crémer, 2010. "Arm's-Length Relationships without Moral Hazard," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(2-3), pages 377-387, 04-05.
    2. Ali Ashraf & M. Kabir Hassan & Kyle J. Putnam & Arja Turunen-Red, 2019. "Prudential Regulatory Regimes, Accounting Standards, And Earnings Management In The Banking Industry," Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Bank Indonesia, vol. 21(3), pages 1-28, January.
    3. Constanza Martínez Ventura, 2005. "Una revisión empírica sobre los determinantes del margen de intermediación en Colombia, 1989-2003," Revista ESPE - Ensayos sobre Política Económica, Banco de la Republica de Colombia, vol. 23(48), pages 118-183, Junio.
    4. V. Bhaskar & Caroline Thomas, 2019. "The Culture of Overconfidence," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 95-110, June.
    5. Suarez, Javier & Sánchez Serrano, Antonio, 2018. "Approaching non-performing loans from a macroprudential angle," Report of the Advisory Scientific Committee 7, European Systemic Risk Board.
    6. Albertazzi, Ugo & Gambacorta, Leonardo, 2009. "Bank profitability and the business cycle," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 393-409, December.
    7. Bouvatier, Vincent & Lepetit, Laetitia, 2008. "Banks' procyclical behavior: Does provisioning matter?," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 18(5), pages 513-526, December.
    8. Harry Huizinga & Luc Laeven, 2019. "The Procyclicality of Banking: Evidence from the Euro Area," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 67(3), pages 496-527, September.
    9. Stephen Hansen & Michael McMahon & Andrea Prat, 2018. "Transparency and Deliberation Within the FOMC: A Computational Linguistics Approach," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 133(2), pages 801-870.
    10. Gaffney, Edward & McCann, Fergal, 2019. "The cyclicality in SICR: mortgage modelling under IFRS 9," ESRB Working Paper Series 92, European Systemic Risk Board.
    11. Ildiko Orban & Oday Tamimi, 2020. "Accounting Model for Impairment under IFRS 9 and its Impact on Loss Allowance," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(4), pages 1259-1277.
    12. Mattozzi, Andrea & Merlo, Antonio, 2008. "Political careers or career politicians?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 597-608, April.
    13. Michael Raith, 2008. "Specific knowledge and performance measurement," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(4), pages 1059-1079, December.
    14. Khadjavi, Menusch & Lange, Andreas & Nicklisch, Andreas, 2014. "The Social Value of Transparency and Accountability: Experimental Evidence from Asymmetric Public Good Games," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100512, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    15. Morais, Bernardo & Ormazabal, Gaizka & Peydro, J.L. & Roa, Monica & Sarmiento Paipilla, Miguel, 2020. "Forward Looking Loan Provisions : Credit Supply and Risk-Taking," Other publications TiSEM fe99a48f-f94a-41d8-bf3f-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    16. Anil Arya & Brian Mittendorf, 2011. "The Benefits of Aggregate Performance Metrics in the Presence of Career Concerns," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 57(8), pages 1424-1437, August.
    17. Clemens A. Otto & Paolo F. Volpin, 2018. "Marking to Market and Inefficient Investment Decisions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(8), pages 3756-3771, August.
    18. Knaup, M. & Wagner, W.B., 2009. "A Market Based Measure of Credit Quality and Banks' Performance During the Subprime Crisis," Other publications TiSEM a6e8a0c8-00de-45b7-bb02-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    19. Juan Amador & José Gómez-González & Andrés Pabón, 2013. "Loan growth and bank risk: new evidence," Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, Springer;Swiss Society for Financial Market Research, vol. 27(4), pages 365-379, December.
    20. César Martinelli & John Duggan, 2014. "The Political Economy of Dynamic Elections: A Survey and Some New Results," Working Papers 1403, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    stability; liquidity risks; systemic risks; pro cyclicality; fair values; information; certainty; regulation; central banks; accountability; macro prudential regulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
    • E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • M4 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting
    • E3 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:29314. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.