An Experimental Investigation on Learning and Context Effects
AbstractThis paper revisited Gregory Bateson’s theory of hierarchical learning through an experiment testing the existence of context effect and learning spill-over in two following games: a coordination game and a two-step battle-of-the sexes. The first part of the experiment is seen as a kind of training period. The different treatments of the coordination game are, in fact, designed so to reinforce different representations of the games, requiring to look at different aspects of a series of images shown in the screen. The second game allows testing if differences in training determine different behaviors in a same situation. Our experiment suggests that the preliminary training influences how the second game is perceived. While the incentive structure of the battle-of-the sexes is not identical to the coordination game, the presence of an image determines a different kind of context similarity with the previous one.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 27807.
Date of creation: 27 Dec 2010
Date of revision:
hierarchical learning; Bateson; experiment; context effects; coordination;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics; Underlying Principles
- B50 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - General
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