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The Impact of Exchange Context on the Activation of Equity in Ultimatum Games

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  • Elizabeth Hoffman
  • Kevin McCabe
  • Vernon Smith

Abstract

In this paper we report the results of additional exchange ultimatum game experiments conducted at the same time as the exchange ultimatum game experiments reported in Hoffman et al. (Games and Economic Behavior, 7(3), pp. 346–380, 1994). In these additional experiments, we use instructions to change an impersonal exchange situation to a personal exchange situation. To do this, we prompt sellers to consider what choices their buyers will make. Game theory would predict that thinking about the situation would lead sellers to make smaller offers to buyers. In contrast, we find a significant increase in seller offers to buyers. This result suggests that encouraging sellers to thinking about buyer choices focuses their attention on the strategic interaction with humans who think they way they do in personal exchange situations, and who may punish them for unacceptable behavior, and not on the logic of the game theoretic structure of the problem. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Experimental Economics.

Volume (Year): 3 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 (June)
Pages: 5-9

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Handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:3:y:2000:i:1:p:5-9

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102888

Related research

Keywords: ultimatum games; equity theory; experimental methods;

References

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  1. Hoffman Elizabeth & McCabe Kevin & Shachat Keith & Smith Vernon, 1994. "Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 346-380, November.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Lusk, Jayson L. & Hudson, Darren, 2004. "Effect of monitor-subject cheap talk on ultimatum game offers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 439-443, July.
  2. Paola Iannello & Alessandro Antonietti, 2008. "Reciprocity in financial decision making: intuitive and analytical mind-reading strategies," International Review of Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 55(1), pages 167-184, April.
  3. Werner Güth & Martin G. Kocher, 2013. "More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature," Jena Economic Research Papers 2013-035, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
  4. Zak, Paul J., 2011. "The physiology of moral sentiments," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 53-65, January.
  5. Massimo Finocchiaro Castro, 2005. "Cultural Goods and Laboratory Experiments," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London 05/06, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised May 2005.
  6. Sally, David & Hill, Elisabeth, 2006. "The development of interpersonal strategy: Autism, theory-of-mind, cooperation and fairness," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 73-97, February.
  7. Smith, Vernon L., 2010. "Theory and experiment: What are the questions?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 3-15, January.
  8. Colin Camerer & Teck-Hua Ho & Juin Kuan Chong, 2003. "A cognitive hierarchy theory of one-shot games: Some preliminary results," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000495, UCLA Department of Economics.
  9. Klaus Abbink & Heike Hennig-Schmidt, 2006. "Neutral versus loaded instructions in a bribery experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 103-121, June.
  10. Houser, Daniel & McCabe, Kevin & Smith, Vernon, 2004. "Cultural group selection, co evolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation (by Joseph Henrich)," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 85-88, January.
  11. Novarese, Marco & Chelini, Chiara & Spada, Anna & Ambrosino, Angela & Trigona, Carla, 2010. "An Experimental Investigation on Learning and Context Effects," MPRA Paper 27807, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  12. Grimalda, Gianluca & Kar, Anirban & Proto, Eugenio, 2008. "The Impact of (In)Equality of Opportunities on Wealth Distribution : Evidence from Ultimatum Games," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 843, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  13. Ilaria Castelli & Davide Massaro & Alan Sanfey & Antonella Marchetti, 2010. "Fairness and intentionality in children’s decision-making," International Review of Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 57(3), pages 269-288, September.
  14. Massimo Finocchiaro Castro, 2004. "Cultural Education and the Voluntary Provision of Cultural Goods: An Experimental Study," Experimental, EconWPA 0404003, EconWPA, revised 27 Oct 2004.
  15. Bart J. Wilson, 2008. "Contra Private Fairness," Working Papers 08-04, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.

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