IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/27342.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Patent Troll Business: An Efficient model to enforce IPR?

Author

Listed:
  • Pohlmann, Tim
  • Opitz, Marieke

Abstract

Patent trolls have many faces, since the media uses this expression in various ways. The patent troll phenomenon thus seems to be an ambiguous term that is discussed in several directions. This paper reveals that a patent troll as such has no distinct shape or appearance. Our analysis redeems a troll classification solely from firms’ market position, such as being non-practicing, and shows that a patent troll business can only be defined by the respective activities to enforce IPR. Using 10 cases, of which five are treated in detail, the analysis reveals a distinct typology of the troll business. This paper is furthermore able to identify troll behavior to be: a) an efficient mechanism to enforce IP rights and b) a strategy that yields excessive license fees and causes inefficient negotiation costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Pohlmann, Tim & Opitz, Marieke, 2010. "The Patent Troll Business: An Efficient model to enforce IPR?," MPRA Paper 27342, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 01 Dec 2010.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:27342
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27342/2/MPRA_paper_27342.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/31923/6/MPRA_paper_31923.pdf
    File Function: revised version
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/47262/1/MPRA_paper_47262.pdf
    File Function: revised version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Salant, David J, 2007. "Formulas for fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory royalty determination," MPRA Paper 8569, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Justus Baron & Tim Pohlmann, 2010. "Essential Patents and Coordination Mechanisms," Post-Print hal-00508792, HAL.
    3. Pohlmann, Tim, 2010. "Attributes and Dynamic Development Phases of Informal ICT Consortia," MPRA Paper 27341, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 01 Jun 2010.
    4. Carl Shapiro, 2001. "Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting," NBER Chapters, in: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 1, pages 119-150, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Catherine Tucker, 2012. "Patent Trolls and Technology Diffusion," NBER Chapters, in: Standards, Patents and Innovations, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Tucker, C.E., 2012. "Institutions, competition and regulation : Intellectual property and innovation," Discussion Paper 2012-030, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bernhard Ganglmair & Emanuele Tarantino, 2012. "Patent Disclosure in Standard Setting," NBER Chapters, in: Standards, Patents and Innovations, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Justus Baron & Yann Ménière & Tim Pohlmann, 2012. "Joint innovation in ICT standards: How consortia drive the volume of patent filings," Working Papers hal-00707291, HAL.
    3. Choi, Jay Pil & Gerlach, Heiko, 2019. "Optimal cross-licensing arrangements: Collusion versus entry deterrence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 120(C).
    4. Llanes Gastón & Trento Stefano, 2011. "Anticommons and Optimal Patent Policy in a Model of Sequential Innovation," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-27, August.
    5. Raza, Werner G., 2021. "COVID-19 and the failure of pharmaceutical innovation for the global South: The example of "neglected diseases" and emerging infectious diseases," Briefing Papers 32a, Austrian Foundation for Development Research (ÖFSE).
    6. Galasso, Alberto & Schankerman, Mark, 2013. "Patents and Cumulative Innovation:Causal Evidence from the Courts," IIR Working Paper 13-16, Institute of Innovation Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    7. Schankerman, Mark & Schuett, Florian, 2016. "Screening for Patent Quality," CEPR Discussion Papers 11688, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Schankerman, Mark & Lanjouw, Jean, 2001. "Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights," CEPR Discussion Papers 3093, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Iain M. Cockburn & Megan J. MacGarvie, 2011. "Entry and Patenting in the Software Industry," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 57(5), pages 915-933, May.
    10. Dietmar Harhoff & Georg von Graevenitz & Stefan Wagner, 2016. "Conflict Resolution, Public Goods, and Patent Thickets," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(3), pages 704-721, March.
    11. Ufuk Akcigit & Sina T. Ates, 2023. "What Happened to US Business Dynamism?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(8), pages 2059-2124.
    12. Beschorner, Patrick Frank Ernst, 2008. "Do Shorter Product Cycles Induce Patent Thickets?," ZEW Discussion Papers 08-098, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    13. Alberto Galasso & Mark Schankerman, 2008. "Patent Thickets and the Market for Innovation: Evidence from Settlement of Patent Disputes," CEP Discussion Papers dp0889, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    14. Dequiedt, V. & Versaevel, B., 2004. "Patent pools and the dynamic incentives to R&D," Working Papers 200412, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
    15. Stefan Wagner, 2008. "Business Method Patents In Europe And Their Strategic Use—Evidence From Franking Device Manufacturers," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(3), pages 173-194.
    16. Sternitzke, Christian, 2013. "An exploratory analysis of patent fencing in pharmaceuticals: The case of PDE5 inhibitors," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 542-551.
    17. Michael Noel & Mark Schankerman, 2013. "Strategic Patenting and Software Innovation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(3), pages 481-520, September.
    18. Ivan Balbuzanov & Maciej H. Kotowski, 2019. "Endowments, Exclusion, and Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(5), pages 1663-1692, September.
    19. Rey, Patrick & Salant, David, 2012. "Abuse of dominance and licensing of intellectual property," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 518-527.
    20. von Graevenitz, Georg & Wagner, Stefan & Harhoff, Dietmar, 2011. "How to measure patent thickets--A novel approach," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 6-9, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Patent Trolls; Patent Sharks Patent Strategies; Patent Failure;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
    • K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
    • M10 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - General

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:27342. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.