The Patent Troll Business: An Efficient model to enforce IPR?
AbstractPatent trolls have many faces, since the media uses this expression in various ways. The patent troll phenomenon thus seems to be an ambiguous term that is discussed in several directions. This paper reveals that a patent troll as such has no distinct shape or appearance. Our analysis redeems a troll classification solely from firms’ market position, such as being non-practicing, and shows that a patent troll business can only be defined by the respective activities to enforce IPR. Using 10 cases, of which five are treated in detail, the analysis reveals a distinct typology of the troll business. This paper is furthermore able to identify troll behavior to be: a) an efficient mechanism to enforce IP rights and b) a strategy that yields excessive license fees and causes inefficient negotiation costs.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 27342.
Date of creation: 01 Nov 2010
Date of revision: 01 Dec 2010
Patent Trolls; Patent Sharks Patent Strategies; Patent Failure;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- O34 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
- K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
- M10 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-01-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-INO-2011-01-03 (Innovation)
- NEP-IPR-2011-01-03 (Intellectual Property Rights)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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