The separation of ownership and control and investment decisions in Mexican manufacturing firms
AbstractWe study how the ownership and control structures may explain investment decisions of Mexican manufacturing firms. We study them with aggregate indexes and the assessment of several regression sets. We use measures of ownership, management and agency costs. The econometric analysis uses longitudinal census data for 182 industries. Our findings support the claim that agency costs, as a measure of the separation of management and control, and firms` size can explain investment decisions. Furthermore the estimations support the necessity to include investment opportunities and cash flow as control variables. The coefficients of all variables are mostly significant and positive.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 25237.
Date of creation: 20 Sep 2010
Date of revision:
Ownership; Control; Investment; Mexico; Manufacturing;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
- L60 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-10-02 (All new papers)
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