Corporate Governance and the Determinants of Investment
AbstractWe use investment-cash flow regressions to show that both asymmetric-information and agency problems are more severe in Continental Europe than in the Anglo-Saxon countries leading to too little investment by firms with attractive investment opportunities and too much by those with poor investment opportunities. Legal systems, accounting standards, and ownership structure systematically affect the investment-cash flow sensitivity. Cash flow coefficients are largest for family-controlled firms in Europe.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 163 (2007)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.mohr.de/jite
Postal: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- O16 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Musiliu 0. Oseni & Michael G. Pollitt, 2013. "The Economic Costs of Unsupplied Electricty: Evidence from Backup Generation among African Firms," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1351, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Esther Kalkbrenner, 2010. "Acquired versus Non-Acquired Subsidiaries - Which Entry Mode do Parent Firms Prefer," NRN working papers 2010-22, The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
- Ruiz-Porras, Antonio & Lopez-Mateo, Celina, 2010. "The separation of ownership and control and investment decisions in Mexican manufacturing firms," MPRA Paper 25237, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, 2010. "Agency Problems and the Fate of Capitalism," NBER Working Papers 16490, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Mueller, Dennis C. & Peev, Evgeni, 2007. "Corporate governance and investment in Central and Eastern Europe," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 414-437, June.
- Rammer, Christian & Köhler, Christian, 2012. "Innovationen, Anlageinvestitionen und immaterielle Investitionen," ZEW Discussion Papers 12-085, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Wolpert).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.