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Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies

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  • Franklin Allen

Abstract

Most of the literature on corporate governance emphasizes that firms should be run in the interests of shareholders. This is an appropriate objective function when markets are perfect and complete. In many emerging economies this is not the case: markets are imperfect and incomplete. The first theme of the paper is that alternative firm objective functions, such as pursuing the interests of all stakeholders, may help overcome market failures. The second theme is that it is not necessarily optimal to use the law to ensure good corporate governance. Other mechanisms such as competition, trust, and reputation may be preferable. Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Oxford Review of Economic Policy.

Volume (Year): 21 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (Summer)
Pages: 164-177

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Handle: RePEc:oup:oxford:v:21:y:2005:i:2:p:164-177

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Web page: http://oxrep.oupjournals.org/

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Cited by:
  1. Ajit Singh & Ann Zammit, 2006. "Corporate Governance, Crony Capitalism and Economic Crises: should the US business model replace the Asian way of "doing business"?," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(4), pages 220-233, 07.
  2. Pagano, Marco & Volpin, Paolo, 2005. "Shareholder Protection, Stock Market Development and Politics," CEPR Discussion Papers 5378, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Michael Dietrich & Jackie Krafft & Jacques-Laurent Ravix, 2008. "Regulation and governance of the firm," Post-Print hal-00203479, HAL.
  4. Jackie Krafft & Yiping Qu & Francesco Quatraro & Jacques-Laurent Ravix, 2013. "Corporate governance, value and performance of firms: New empirical results on convergence from a large international database," Post-Print hal-00786664, HAL.
  5. Dariush Foroghi & Hadi Amiri & Zahra Nokhbeh Fallah, 2013. "Corporate Governance and Conservatism," International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences, Human Resource Management Academic Research Society, International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences, vol. 3(4), pages 61-71, October.
  6. Sándor Gardó, 2010. "Bank Governance and Financial Stability in CESEE: A Review of the Literature," Focus on European Economic Integration, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank), issue 1.
  7. Ruiz-Porras, Antonio & Lopez-Mateo, Celina, 2011. "Corporate governance, market competition and investment decisions in Mexican manufacturing firms," MPRA Paper 28452, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. repec:onb:oenbwp:y:2010:i:1:b:1 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Lloyd Steier, 2009. "Familial capitalism in global institutional contexts: Implications for corporate governance and entrepreneurship in East Asia," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 513-535, September.
  10. Graham, John R. & Harvey, Campbell R. & Puri, Manju, 2013. "Managerial attitudes and corporate actions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(1), pages 103-121.
  11. Jackie Krafft & Yiping Qu & Jacques-Laurent Ravix, 2008. "Corporate governance, industry dynamics and firms performance on the stock market," Post-Print hal-00203544, HAL.
  12. Dennis Mueller, 2006. "Corporate Governance and Economic Performance," International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(5), pages 623-643.
  13. repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00786664 is not listed on IDEAS
  14. Jackie Krafft & Jacques-Laurent Ravix, 2008. "Corporate governance in advanced economies: lessons in a post financial crash era Introduction to the Special Issue," Post-Print hal-00332737, HAL.
  15. Jackie Krafft & Yiping Qu & Jacques-Laurent Ravix, 2011. "Gouvernance d'entreprise et performances sectorielles: une réévaluation de la fiabilité des scores et des mesures de bonne gouvernance," Post-Print hal-00493371, HAL.
  16. Ruiz-Porras, Antonio & Lopez-Mateo, Celina, 2010. "The separation of ownership and control and investment decisions in Mexican manufacturing firms," MPRA Paper 25237, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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