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The political economy of international regulatory convergence in public utilities

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Author Info
Bonardi, Jean-Philippe
Urbiztondo, Santiago
Quelin, Bertrand

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Abstract

To what extent should public utilities regulation be expected to converge across countries? When it occurs, will regulatory convergence lead to positive outcomes for utility sectors? This paper attempts to provide new answers to these questions. Building on the core proposition of the New Institutional Economics (NIE) that similar regulations generate different outcomes depending on their fit with the underlying domestic institutions, we develop a simple theoretical model and explore its implications by examining the diffusion of local loop unbundling (LLU) regulations in the telecommunications sector. We find support for the ideas (1) that once institutional factors are taken into account, one should expect some convergence in public utility regulation but with still a significant degree of local experimentation, and (2) this process will lead to very different results regarding the impact of regulation.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14435/
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 14435.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:14435

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Related research
Keywords: Regulatory convergence; lobbying; utilities;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
F5 - International Economics - - International Relations and International Political Economy

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  1. Tarun Khanna & Joe Kogan & Krishna Palepu, 2006. "Globalization and Similarities in Corporate Governance: A Cross-Country Analysis," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 88(1), pages 69-90, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Teske, Paul E, 1991. " Rent-Seeking in the Deregulatory Environment: State Telecommunications," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 68(1-3), pages 235-43, January.
  3. Oecd, 2001. "The Development of Broadband Access in the OECD Countries," OECD Digital Economy Papers 56, OECD, Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry. [Downloadable!]
  4. Phedon Nicolaides, 2004. "The Political Economy of Multi-tiered Regulation in Europe," Journal of Common Market Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(3), pages 599-618, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Rainer Eising, 2002. "Policy Learning in Embedded Negotiations: Explaining EU Electricity Liberalization," International Organization, MIT Press, vol. 56(1), pages 85-120, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Levy, Brian & Spiller, Pablo T, 1994. "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 201-46, October.
  7. Eising, Rainer, 2002. "Policy Learning in Embedded Negotiations: Explaining EU Electricity Liberalization," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(01), pages 85-120, February. [Downloadable!]
  8. Frieden, Jeffry A., 1991. "Invested interests: the politics of national economic policies in a world of global finance," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(04), pages 425-451, September. [Downloadable!]
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