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The political economy of international regulatory convergence in public utilities

Author

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  • Bertrand Quélin

    (GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Jean-Philippe Bonardi
  • Santiago Urbiztondo

Abstract

To what extent should public utilities regulation be expected toconverge across countries? When it occurs, will it generate good outcomes?Building on the core proposition of the New Institutional Economics thatsimilar regulations generate different outcomes depending on their fit withthe underlying domestic institutions, we develop a simple model and exploreits implications by examining the diffusion of local loop unbundling (LLU)regulations. We argue that¿ one should expect some convergence in public utility regulation but withstill a significant degree of local experimentation¿ this process will have very different impacts of regulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Bertrand Quélin & Jean-Philippe Bonardi & Santiago Urbiztondo, 2009. "The political economy of international regulatory convergence in public utilities," Post-Print hal-00491668, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00491668
    DOI: 10.1504/IJMNE.2009.024786
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00491668
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Barun, Tereza, 2019. "Fixed Internet Access Regulatory Framework and its Influence on Firm's Strategic Decision Making," 7th International OFEL Conference on Governance, Management and Entrepreneurship: Embracing Diversity in Organisations (Dubrovnik, 2019), in: 7th International OFEL Conference on Governance, Management and Entrepreneurship: Embracing Diversity in Organisations. April 5th - 6th, 2019, Dubrovn, pages 298-318, Governance Research and Development Centre (CIRU), Zagreb.
    2. Boute, Anatole, 2012. "Promoting renewable energy through capacity markets: An analysis of the Russian support scheme," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 68-77.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    unbundling; regulatory convergence; telecommunications; unbundling.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
    • F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
    • F5 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy

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