The internal limits to firms' nonmarket activities
AbstractIt is well documented that firms develop nonmarket strategies in an effort to shape public policy changes to their advantage. But are there no limits to this? This paper argues that there is, in fact, an important limitation, internal to the firm, that stems from the necessity for firms to integrate market and nonmarket activities. Because the two types of activities are not always complements but sometimes substitutes, firms end up forgoing part of their nonmarket activities to avoid restricting the development of their market strategies. This argument is tested in the context of the European telecommunications industry. Results suggest that there is reasonable ground for optimism regarding the potentially negative influence that firms’ nonmarket activities might play in a democracy.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 14500.
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Nonmarket activities; lobbying; deregulation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- H00 - Public Economics - - General - - - General
- M21 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Economics - - - Business Economics
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-04-13 (All new papers)
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