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The internal limits to firms' nonmarket activities

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Author Info
Bonardi, Jean-Philippe

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Abstract

It is well documented that firms develop nonmarket strategies in an effort to shape public policy changes to their advantage. But are there no limits to this? This paper argues that there is, in fact, an important limitation, internal to the firm, that stems from the necessity for firms to integrate market and nonmarket activities. Because the two types of activities are not always complements but sometimes substitutes, firms end up forgoing part of their nonmarket activities to avoid restricting the development of their market strategies. This argument is tested in the context of the European telecommunications industry. Results suggest that there is reasonable ground for optimism regarding the potentially negative influence that firms’ nonmarket activities might play in a democracy.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 14500.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:14500

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Related research
Keywords: Nonmarket activities; lobbying; deregulation;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
H00 - Public Economics - - General - - - General
M21 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Economics - - - Business Economics

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  1. Mara Faccio, 2006. "Politically Connected Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 369-386, March. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Spiller, Pablo T & Cardilli, Carlo G, 1997. "The Frontier of Telecommunications Deregulation: Small Countries Leading the Pack," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 127-38, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. McCormick, Robert E & Shughart, William F, II & Tollison, Robert D, 1984. "The Disinterest in Deregulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(5), pages 1075-79, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Teske, Paul E, 1991. " Rent-Seeking in the Deregulatory Environment: State Telecommunications," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 68(1-3), pages 235-43, January.
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  8. Thomas P. Lyon & John W. Maxwell, 2004. "Astroturf: Interest Group Lobbying and Corporate Strategy," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 13(4), pages 561-597, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. MARA FACCIO & RONALD W. MASULIS & JOHN J. McCONNELL, 2006. "Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(6), pages 2597-2635, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Amacher, Ryan, et al, 1985. "The Behavior of Regulatory Activity over the Business Cycle: An Empirical Test," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 23(1), pages 7-19, January.
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