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Welfare dynamics based on a new concept of inefficient equilibrium

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  • Zaman, Md Monowaruz

Abstract

This article has developed a new model of welfare dynamics under imperfect information or imperfect competition by introducing a new concept of ‘inefficient welfare equilibrium’. It assumes that an economy can be split into two virtual parts. For one part the fundamental welfare theorems are valid and for the other part welfare is yet to achieve. This model is enhanced to describe market dynamics where market is not uniform but distributed in layers of energy states. The probability of achieving Pareto efficiency decreases down along the market energy states.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11303/
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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11805/
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 11303.

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Date of creation: 18 Aug 2008
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:11303

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Related research

Keywords: Pareto efficiency; Pareto improvement; information; principal-agent problem; welfare; poverty; bottom-up economics; information asymmetry; market energy; welfare dynamics;

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References

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  1. George J. Stigler, 1967. "Imperfections in the Capital Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 75, pages 287.
  2. Simon, Herbert A, 1986. "Rationality in Psychology and Economics," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(4), pages S209-24, October.
  3. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2000. "The Contributions Of The Economics Of Information To Twentieth Century Economics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(4), pages 1441-1478, November.
  4. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1991. "The Invisible Hand and Modern Welfare Economics," NBER Working Papers 3641, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. G. Hodgson., 2007. "What Are Institutions?," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 8.
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Cited by:
  1. Leisa Perch, 2011. "Mitigation of What and by What? Adaptation by Whom and for Whom? Dilemmas in Delivering for the Poor and the Vulnerable in International Climate Policy," Working Papers 79, International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth.
  2. Leisa Perch, 2010. "Maximizing Co-Benefits: Exploring Opportunities to Strengthen Equality and Poverty Reduction through Adaptation to Climate Change," Working Papers 75, International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth.
  3. Zaman, Md Monowaruz, 2010. "An Unbiased Pareto Improvement strategy for poverty alleviation," MPRA Paper 27800, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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