Welfare dynamics based on a new concept of inefficient equilibrium
AbstractThis article has developed a new model of welfare dynamics under imperfect information or imperfect competition by introducing a new concept of ‘inefficient welfare equilibrium’. It assumes that an economy can be split into two virtual parts. For one part the fundamental welfare theorems are valid and for the other part welfare is yet to achieve. This model is enhanced to describe market dynamics where market is not uniform but distributed in layers of energy states. The probability of achieving Pareto efficiency decreases down along the market energy states.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 11303.
Date of creation: 18 Aug 2008
Date of revision:
Pareto efficiency; Pareto improvement; information; principal-agent problem; welfare; poverty; bottom-up economics; information asymmetry; market energy; welfare dynamics;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- O11 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
- I31 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - General Welfare, Well-Being
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
- D49 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Other
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-11-04 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2000. "The Contributions Of The Economics Of Information To Twentieth Century Economics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 115(4), pages 1441-1478, November.
- G. Hodgson., 2007. "What Are Institutions?," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 8.
- George J. Stigler, 1967. "Imperfections in the Capital Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 75, pages 287.
- Simon, Herbert A, 1986. "Rationality in Psychology and Economics," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(4), pages S209-24, October.
- Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1991. "The Invisible Hand and Modern Welfare Economics," NBER Working Papers 3641, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Leisa Perch, 2010. "Maximizing Co-Benefits: Exploring Opportunities to Strengthen Equality and Poverty Reduction through Adaptation to Climate Change," Working Papers 75, International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth.
- Zaman, Md Monowaruz, 2010. "An Unbiased Pareto Improvement strategy for poverty alleviation," MPRA Paper 27800, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Leisa Perch, 2011. "Mitigation of What and by What? Adaptation by Whom and for Whom? Dilemmas in Delivering for the Poor and the Vulnerable in International Climate Policy," Working Papers 79, International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.