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The Tale of two Crises in the Time of Covid-19

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  • Aniket, Kumar
  • Chowdhury, Rashedur

Abstract

We document the challenges faced by a sub-district called Phulbari in Bangladesh during Covid-19 lockdown. We do so using a series of 24 interviews with a wide range of individuals conducted during May 2020. What emerges is a picture of an under-resourced local administra- tion trying their best to cope with the situation. The local administration’s efforts have been complemented by efforts of the civil society. While social distancing policies have potentially helped prevent a Covid-19 outbreak, it has created an economic crisis in its wake. We suggest some specific policy proposals that can help alleviate the economic crisis without risking an outbreak.

Suggested Citation

  • Aniket, Kumar & Chowdhury, Rashedur, 2020. "The Tale of two Crises in the Time of Covid-19," MPRA Paper 106716, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:106716
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/106716/1/thetale.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Covid-19; Economic Development; Governance; Social Norms; Poverty; Pandemic;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
    • O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • O38 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Government Policy

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