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Incomplete Regulation, Asymmetric Information and Collusion-Proofness

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  • Marco Meireles

    ()
    (Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto)

  • Paula Sarmento

    ()
    (CEF.UP, Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto)

Abstract

In an incomplete regulation framework the Regulator cannot replicate all the possible outcomes by himself since he has no influence on some firms present in the market. When facing asymmetric information regarding the regulated firm’s costs, it may be better for the Regulator to allow the other competitors to extract a truthful report from her through side-payments in a collusion and therefore the “Collusion-Proofness Principle” may not hold. In fact, by introducing an exogenous number of unregulated competitors, Social Welfare differences seem to favour a Collusion-Allowing equilibrium. However, such result will strongly depend on the relative importance given by the Regulator to the Consumer Surplus.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto in its series FEP Working Papers with number 320.

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Length: 43 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:por:fepwps:320

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Keywords: Incomplete Regulation; Asymmetric Information; Collusion; Market Competition;

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References

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  1. Tangeras, Thomas P., 2002. "Collusion-proof yardstick competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 231-254, February.
  2. Myerson, Roger B, 1979. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January.
  3. Laffont, J.J. & Martimort, D., 1996. "Collusion Under Asymmetric Information," Papers, Toulouse - GREMAQ 95.389, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
  4. Aubert, Cécile & Pouyet, Jérôme, 2006. "Incomplete regulation, market competition and collusion," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/13654, Paris Dauphine University.
  5. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Martimort, David, 1998. "Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation," IDEI Working Papers 81, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  6. Cécile Aubert & Jérôme Pouyet, 2006. "Incomplete regulation, market competition and collusion," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 113-142, August.
  7. Green, Jerry & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1977. "Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 45(2), pages 427-38, March.
  8. Caillaud, Bernard, 1990. "Regulation, competition, and asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 87-110, October.
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