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A product innovation game with managerial delegation

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  • Luciano Fanti
  • Luca Gori

Abstract

This article revisits the works of Lambertini and Rossini (1998) and Bernhofen and Bernhofen (1999) and also extends the analysis to the effects of product innovation in Cournot and Bertrand duopolies with sales delegation.

Suggested Citation

  • Luciano Fanti & Luca Gori, 2017. "A product innovation game with managerial delegation," Discussion Papers 2017/223, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    • Handle: RePEc:pie:dsedps:2017/223
    Note: ISSN 2039-1854
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    File URL: https://www.ec.unipi.it/documents/Ricerca/papers/2017-223.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lambertini, Luca, 1996. "Choosing Roles in a Duopoly for Endogenously Differentiated Products," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(67), pages 205-224, December.
    2. Hoefele, Andreas, 2016. "Endogenous product differentiation and international R&D policy," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 335-346.
    3. Lorz Oliver & Wrede Matthias, 2009. "Trade and Variety in a Model of Endogenous Product Differentiation," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-14, November.
    4. Vickers, John, 1985. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-147, Supplemen.
    5. Nirvikar Singh & Xavier Vives, 1984. "Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(4), pages 546-554, Winter.
    6. Lambertini, Luca & Poddar, Sougata & Sasaki, Dan, 2002. "Research joint ventures, product differentiation, and price collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(6), pages 829-854, June.
    7. Bernhofen, Daniel M. & Bernhofen, Laura T., 1999. "On the likelihood of a prisoners' dilemma in a differentiated duopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 291-294, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Luciano Fanti & Luca Gori, 2017. "Product innovation and two-part tariff vertical contracts," Discussion Papers 2017/222, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Duopoly; Product innovation; Sales delegation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • J53 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Labor-Management Relations; Industrial Jurisprudence
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance

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