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Rebuttal Addendum: Assessment of Submissions of the California Parties

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Author Info
Peter Cramton () (Economics Department, University of Maryland)

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Abstract

In light of my report "Competitive Bidding Behavior in Uniform Price Auction Markets" ("Competitive Bidding Behavior Report"), which is being separately filed in this proceeding, I have reviewed the testimony of Drs. Fox-Penner, Stern, Berry, and Reynolds on behalf of the California parties, and Mr. Hanser on behalf of Southern California Edison. Contrary to their assertions, taken as a whole, the economists’ data and analyses do not provide economic evidence that market prices in California were fundamentally distorted by anticompetitive behavior, an abuse of market power, manipulative behavior, or collusion. The prices that prevailed in California during the time period between May 2000 and December 2001—while often higher than historical and forecast prices—were nevertheless market prices: they were determined by the competitive, independent, profit-maximizing decisions of many different firms, based on the market rules in place at the time. The actions of these firms are consistent with economic expectations of independent, competitive behavior in actual, "workably competitive" markets. The California Parties’ economists have used an inappropriate theoretical norm of perfectly competitive markets as a basis for assessing the observed outcomes, and as a basis for estimating the generators’ retroactive refund obligations. As a consequence, there is no reasonable economic basis for their conclusions, both with respect to the generators’ behavior and the calculation of refunds.

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File URL: http://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers2000-2004/cramton-bidding-behavior-in-electricity-markets.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton in its series Papers of Peter Cramton with number 03ferc2.

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Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision: 2003
Publication status: Published in Report before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, March 2003.
Handle: RePEc:pcc:pccumd:03ferc2

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Postal: Economics Department, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7211
Phone: (202) 318-0520
Fax: (202) 318-0520
Web page: http://www.cramton.umd.edu

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Peter Cramton).

Related research
Keywords: Auctions Electricity Auctions Market Design

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Joskow, Paul L, 1997. "Restructuring, Competition and Regulatory Reform in the U.S. Electricity Sector," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 119-38, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Catherine D. Wolfram, 1998. "Strategic Bidding in a Multiunit Auction: An Empirical Analysis of Bids to Supply Electricity in England and Wales," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(4), pages 703-725, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Klemperer, Paul D & Meyer, Margaret A, 1989. "Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(6), pages 1243-77, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1995. "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 98wpdr, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 22 Jul 2002. [Downloadable!]
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