Reputation in the Market for Stolen Data
Abstract
Internet commerce has made it easier to compare prices and shop online.� However, it has also exposed consumers to a new kind of crime in the form of the electronic theft of payment details.� However the skills required to successfully intercept payment data differ from the skills required to use that information for one’s own gain.� This creates gains to trade between those who steal the data and those who know how to use it.� This particular illicit market has the added disadvantage that trade takes place online and the only identification of any paticular trader comes from a username which can be changed at zero cost.� This paper examines the reputation mechanisms that keep this market working and considers whether they might constitute an Achilles’ Heel that governments keen to reduce crime might exploit.Download Info
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.Bibliographic Info
Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 611.Length:
Date of creation: 01 Jun 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:611
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Manor Rd. Building, Oxford, OX1 3UQ
Email:
Web page: http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/
More information through EDIRC
Related research
Keywords: Reputation; Illicit trade; Illegal behavior and the enforement of law;Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Z18 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Public Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-06-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-ICT-2012-06-25 (Information & Communication Technologies)
- NEP-LAW-2012-06-25 (Law & Economics)
References
No references listed on IDEASYou can help add them by filling out this form.
Citations
Lists
This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:611For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Caroline Wise).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

